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A Second Amendment Moment 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 
Nicholas J. Johnson† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Constitutional Politics 
Bruce Ackerman’s claim that America’s endorsement of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies actually changed the 
United States Constitution to affirm an activist regulatory 
state, advances the idea that higher lawmaking on the same 
order as Article Five amendment can be attained through and 
discerned by attention to our “constitutional politics.”1  
Ackerman’s “Dualist” model requires that we distinguish 
between two types of politics.2  In normal politics, organized 
interest groups try to influence democratically elected 
representatives while regular citizens get on with life.3  In 
constitutional politics, the mass of citizens are energized to 
engage and debate matters of fundamental principle.4  Our 
history is dominated by normal politics.  But our tradition 
places a higher value on mobilized efforts to gain the consent of 
  
 † Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, J.D. Harvard Law 
School, 1984, B.S.B.A. West Virginia University, 1981 Magna Cum Laude.  Thanks to 
Dan Richman, Bob Dowlett, Robert Cottrol, Don Kates, C. Kates and Dave Kopel for 
comments on this article. 
 1 Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 
453, 459 (1989). 
We use the revised description of Reconstruction to gain a new perspective on 
the next great constitutional transformation: the struggle between the 
Roosevelt Presidency and the Old Court that culminated in the legitimation 
of the activist regulatory state . . . .  Like the Reconstruction Republicans, the 
New Deal Democrats amended the Constitution by provoking a complex 
constitutional dialogue between the voters at large and institutions of the 
national government, a dialogue that ultimately substituted for the more 
federalistic processes of constitutional revision detailed in Article Five.  
Id. 
 2 See id. at 461.  
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. at 462. 
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the people to new governing principles.  Within Dualism, the 
rare triumphs of constitutional politics are transformative.  
These changes may be procedurally suspect.  But when 
ultimately validated by the people, they become part of our 
higher law. 
Formalists balk that our Constitution establishes a 
strict and quite clear amendment process.  But Ackerman 
counters that important constitutional changes have not been 
procedurally pristine.  The Constitution itself emerged in a 
procedurally suspect way out of a gathering to amend the 
Articles of Confederation.5  And the dramatic shift in national 
policy wrought by the Reconstruction Congress is equally 
problematic.6 
Constitutional change skirting the formalities of Article 
Five is, then, nothing new.  And if we are attentive, we can 
discern important political moments that yield grand 
constitutional messages and signal substantive changes in our 
  
 5 Id. at 456 (“Almost all modern lawyers recognize that, in proposing a new 
Constitution in the name of We the People, the Philadelphia Convention was acting 
illegally under the terms established by America’s first formal constitution—the 
Articles of Confederation solemnly ratified by all thirteen states only a few years 
before.”).   
 6 Id. at 496. 
The then-existing Southern governments rejected the Fourteenth 
Amendment when it was proposed . . . Congress responded by destroying 
these dissenting governments and gaining the assent of new ones to the 
Fourteenth Amendment;  when these new Southern governments sought to 
withdraw their predecessors’ rejections, Secretary of State Seward first 
issued a Proclamation expressing “doubt and uncertainty” whether the 
Amendment had been ratified; and . . . it was only upon the express demand 
of Congress that Seward finally issued a second Proclamation unequivocally 
pronouncing the Amendment valid.  
Id.  Early on, the Court refused to affirm that the Reconstruction Republicans played 
by the rules.  All the Court was willing to say was this:  
This decision by the political departments of the Government as to the 
validity of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has been accepted.  
We think that in accordance with this historic precedent the question of the 
efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of previous rejection 
or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question 
pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the 
Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption 
of the amendment.  
Id. at 497 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1939)). 
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Constitution, even while the text of the document remains the 
same.7  
Professor Ackerman tells an intriguing story of how the 
political conflict between the branches of government and the 
appeal to the people by the executive for support of its 
transformative agenda—the “Constitutional Politics” of the 
New Deal—signaled a moment of higher lawmaking.  But it is 
possible to agree with Ackerman that these constitutional 
politics say something important about the Constitution and 
still reject his full basket of claims, particularly, the intricate 
formula of: Constitutional Impasse Æ Triggering Election Æ 
Challenge to Institutional Legitimacy Æ Switch In Time, which 
he argues verifies a broad-based, democratically legitimate 
endorsement of baseline constitutional change.8  
Granting Ackerman’s characterization of the procedural 
flaws that afflict the Constitution and Reconstruction 
Amendments, it is still easy to conclude that the New Deal was 
different.  It is the difference between a team that wins by 
cheating in the last inning and one that claims victory without 
ever showing up to play.  Expanding the meeting agenda9 or 
rough-handling the Article Five process,10 is quite different 
from ignoring process altogether.11   
Then there is the pragmatic objection.  Dramatic change 
ought to be hard.  And when it happens we need a solid record 
that it has occurred, if for no other reason than our future 
debates about further change require a stable platform on 
which to hold those conversations.  
But Pragmatists, unwilling to surrender this 
foundation, are still left to wrestle with the fact that some 
political moments do seem more important, more dramatic, 
  
 7 The New Deal validated constitutional change the same way that the 
otherwise procedurally suspect Fourteenth Amendment was validated.  Ackerman, 
supra note 1, at 459-60. 
 8 Id. at 509-10: 
It is this four part schema, more than the one sketched by the rules of Article 
Five, that structured the higher lawmaking process by which the American 
people defined, debated and ultimately legitimated the Republicans’ 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .  [T]he New Deal Democrats’ struggle to 
constitutionalize activist national government in the 1930’s tracked the four 
stage process through which Reconstruction Republicans constitutionalized 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 9 See supra note 5. 
 10 See supra note 6. 
 11 See supra note 1. 
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than others.  Certainly the New Deal was a bigger deal than 
some isolated piece of pork barrel legislation.  And 
consequently, the Pragmatist is left to wonder, can we discern 
through Ackerman’s model something less dramatic than 
constitutional amendment, but still more important than the 
signals released by an obscure piece of legislative pork?  And 
for the Formalist, is it simply more palatable to credit the 
existence of grand constitutional moments, but conclude that 
they just do less work than Ackerman posits; that their 
appearance and perhaps also their absence, signals important 
things, but still something less than fundamental 
constitutional change?  Can we, through attention to 
constitutional politics, gain something important by reaching 
for less than Ackerman claims is possible? 
Imagine the Court facing an issue that divides the 
nation.  Imagine rights-claimants with plausible historical and 
textual support for a right that has been only glancingly or 
ambiguously recognized by the Court.  Imagine the right 
protecting something Americans in many circles find 
abhorrent.  And let us say that the text and history is 
ambiguous and distant enough that opponents have viable 
claims that no such right exists.  Maybe here, most plausibly, 
constitutional politics should guide our decision. 
Granted, this may seem quite artificial as a start.  Our 
Constitution is mature, you say.  Our debates and 
constitutional controversies no longer involve such basic 
questions.  We debate what is protected speech, not whether 
speech is protected.  We debate the scope of privacy or freedom 
of conscience.  But not whether those rights exist.  We are 
beyond binary choices . . . except of course that we are not. 
B. Constitutional Politics and the Second Amendment 
Debate 
If the Second Amendment were a weather system we 
would not know whether we are wet or dry.  Imagine that the 
answer to the question, “Does the Constitution prohibit 
warrantless searches and seizures within some range?” was 
“Well, we just don’t know.” On the question, “Do individual 
Americans have a right to keep and bear arms?,” the Court’s 
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efforts leave neutral observers not knowing whether it is night 
or day.12 
So we have our binary choice.  And it is here that 
Ackerman’s constitutional politics does its most legitimate 
work.  “We the people” most assuredly said something about 
arms in the Bill of Rights.13  But much time has passed since 
then and it is arguably difficult to decipher the message.14  
Should we attempt to unravel it through some foundationalist 
exercise, studying the framers and their influences, the reams 
of scholarship on the importance of an armed citizenry, the 
make-up of the republican militia, or the perceived dangers of a 
state monopoly on the tools of violence?  Is it better just to treat 
the matter as essentially political and leave the legislature free 
to implement whatever seems to be the will of the prevailing 
majority? 
Both approaches are flawed according to Ackerman.  It 
is by reference to these extremes that he builds the case for 
Dualism.  He would criticize that, while leaving the issue to 
majority will would please the pure democrat (the “Burkean” in 
Ackerman’s description, who would cede the field to the 
governing majority), it is precisely this capitulation to 
temporary majorities that is the weakness of the Burkean 
approach.  And the other extreme, a foundationalist15 
determination made by reference to ancient texts, originalist 
political philosophies, or abstract normative speculations, is 
equally problematic, tethering us to ideas that simply might 
not work in our world. 
It is here that Ackerman’s Dualism presents its 
strongest claim for legitimacy.  Dualism gives the Court the 
tools to engage the gun question in a way that avoids both 
  
 12 See discussion infra notes 331-36 of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 
(1939). 
 13 “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. II. 
 14 Eugene Volokh argues that prefatory language like the subordinate clause 
“A well regulated militia” was common in the language of state constitutions at the 
time and was never interpreted as a strict limitation on the independent clause.  
Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 794-95 
(1998). 
 15 A foundationalist set of principles would restrain (or the Burkean would 
say thwart) democratic will as manifested in the latest set of legislative commands.  
See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 466-67. 
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Foundationalist and Burkean snares in a place where they are 
serious impediments.16 
Dualism of course does not promise certainty.  The 
constitutional politics of gun rights might yield nothing or just 
an inconclusive draw.  But that is the question.  Is there any 
message in our constitutional politics about a right to keep and 
bear arms?  What should Justices engaging the first really 
serious consideration of the Second Amendment in the modern 
era take as the sense of “We the People” about whether our 
current armed state is an unfortunate anachronism or a 
peculiar but core part of our Americanism?17 
Some things can be said for certain.  Over a wide range 
of controversies utilizing divergent constitutional models, we 
have erred in favor of rights and held rights reductionists to a 
higher burden.  This suggests that as we scour our 
constitutional politics for signals about gun rights, the burden 
should fall on rights reductionists to show by some margin that 
America has embraced their agenda.18 
  
 16 How does one perform the foundationalist exercise where there seems to be 
such wide variation by region and over time about the range of plausible foundational 
rights?  How sure can we be that we have it right if the right we preserve seems mainly 
relevant to people who lived twenty-five generations ago, or where there are vast and 
different views about the right as we move from an Upper West Side apartment to a 
ridge top cabin on the western border of Virginia?  The Court had a chance to clarify 
the Second Amendment in Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).  See the discussion in Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun 
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 
251 (1983).  Perhaps the Court was waiting for the people to speak.  And if 10,000 other 
communities had followed Morton Grove, we might say that they had. 
 17 A problematic thing about constitutional moments is that they are more 
loosely defined than formal constitutional amendments.  They appear most clearly in 
the eye of the beholder.  It is a bit too exclusive to say that only the constitutional 
priesthood can, or should be allowed to identify them.  This view is elitist and 
undemocratic.  But it is messy and unpredictable to permit just any old citizen to start 
mining for constitutional moments.  That, however, appears to be an inevitable 
characteristic of the theory.  Somewhere, someone will see it as a vehicle to do 
something its developers dislike.  How the developers react is a test of whether we 
should take the theory seriously.   
 18 Judge Cummings makes the point in context, in an opinion that led the 
Fifth Circuit to break ranks and declare that the Second Amendment guarantees an 
individual right. 
As Professor Ronald Dworkin has argued, what it means to take rights 
seriously is that one will honor them even when there is significant social 
cost in doing so.  Protecting freedom of speech, the rights of criminal 
defendants, or any other part of the Bill of Rights has significant costs—
criminals going free, oppressed groups having to hear viciously racist speech 
and so on—consequences which we take for granted in defending the Bill of 
Rights.  This mind-set changes, however, when the Second Amendment is 
concerned.  “Cost-benefit” analysis, rightly or wrongly, has become viewed as 
a “conservative” weapon to attack liberal rights.  Yet the tables are strikingly 
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This of course ignores a complicated reality.  Many of us 
reject the commitment to rights expansion when it comes to 
gun rights.19  Many believe guns are just different; that their 
costs are too high and that the prefatory language in the 
Second Amendment makes it unique.  But that is too 
simplistic. 
Both the Framing and the Reconstruction offer more 
than plausible evidence that an individual right has been 
protected explicitly through the Second Amendment.20  These 
claims are not burdened by process objections and thus, while 
contestable, are still less controversial than Ackerman’s claim 
about the constitutional implications of the New Deal.  A great 
deal of the “standard model”21 scholarship on the Second 
Amendment is grounded on the evidence from these two 
periods.22  This scholarship has even convinced some longtime 
  
turned when the Second Amendment comes into play.  Here “conservatives” 
argue in effect that social costs are irrelevant and “liberals” argue for a notion 
of the “living Constitution” and “changed circumstances” that would have the 
practical consequence of erasing the Second Amendment from the 
Constitution.  
. . . .  
Thus, concerns about the social costs of enforcing the Second Amendment 
must be outweighed by considering the lengths to which the federal courts 
have gone to uphold other rights in the Constitution.  The rights of the 
Second Amendment should be as zealously guarded as the other individual 
liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights.  
United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609-10 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d, 270 F.3d 
203 (5th Cir. 2001).  See also Nicholas J. Johnson, Plenary Power and Constitutional 
Outcasts: Federal Power, Critical Race Theory, and the Second, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendments, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1580-83 (1996). 
 19 Former ACLU national board member Alan Dershowitz, who admits that 
he “hates” guns and wishes to see the Second Amendment repealed, nevertheless 
warns: 
Foolish liberals who are trying to read the Second Amendment out of the 
Constitution by claiming it’s not an individual right or that it’s too much of a 
public safety hazard don’t see the danger in the big picture.  They’re courting 
disaster by encouraging others to use the same means to eliminate portions 
of the Constitution they don’t like. 
Dan Gifford, The Conceptual Foundations of Anglo-American Jurisprudence in Religion 
and Reason, 62 TENN. L. REV. 759, 789 (1995) (quoting telephone interviews with Alan 
Dershowitz, Law Professor at Harvard University (May 3-4, 1994)). 
 20 See infra note 22. 
 21 Glenn Reynolds elaborates the “standard model” in Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 464-88 
(1995). 
 22 See, e.g., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum Opinion 
for the Att’y Gen.: Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right 48, 99-
101 (Aug. 24, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.pdf [hereinafter DOJ 
Memorandum]. 
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skeptics23 that the Second Amendment was intended to protect 
an individual right.  The United States Government, based 
substantially on this scholarship, also has concluded that the 
Second Amendment guarantees an individual right.24   
True, there is opposition to the standard model.  The 
lower federal courts, with a few exceptions,25 have advanced 
collective rights views that basically ignore both sides of the 
scholarly debate.26  It is for exactly this reason that some will 
object it is error to place the burden of proof, so to speak, on the 
rights reductionists.  
But before we get mired down over allocating the 
burden, let us consider for a moment what kind of story might 
satisfy it.  Consider how Americans might speak in support of 
rights reduction.   
Suppose Congress voted in a gun ban that was resisted 
by conservatives whose obstructionism got them voted out of 
office and caused them to lose control of the House.  Suppose 
states started to amend their constitutions to permit legislation 
barring private possession of firearms.  Suppose that state 
after state also started to enact legislation that banned the 
possession of the type of firearms most used in crime, 
handguns.27  Layer it with detail and have it proceed over a 
generation or so and this starts to compete with Ackerman’s 
  
 23 For a critique of Laurence Tribe’s shift of opinion, see Christopher 
Chrisman, Constitutional Structure and the Second Amendment: A Defense of the 
Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 441-42 (2001).  See also 
Akhil Reed Amar & Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., Well Regulated Militias, and More, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31; Collin Levey, Rule of Law: Liberals Have Second 
Thoughts on the Second Amendment, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at A23. 
 24 See DOJ Memorandum, supra note 22, at 105. 
 25 Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1065-66, 1068 nn.19-23, 1069 & n.24, 
1070, 1071 & n.27, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002) (cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003) (using 
collective rights scholarship to reject the individual rights view); United States v. 
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 220-221, 220 n.12, 255-59 (5th Cir. 2001) (using standard 
model scholarship to endorse individual rights view). 
 26 See, e.g., Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1063-64. 
Like the other courts, we reached our [earlier] conclusion regarding the 
Second Amendment’s scope largely on the basis of the rather cursory 
discussion in Miller, and touched only briefly on the merits of the 
debate . . . .  Miller, like most other cases that address the Second 
Amendment, fails to provide much reasoning in support of its conclusion. 
Id. 
 27 This is the open agenda of the Coalition to Ban Handguns.  The coalition 
includes numerous national organizations like the ACLU, numerous religious groups 
and the YWCA.  See, e.g., MICHAEL K. BEARD & SAMUEL S. FIELDS, NAT’L COAL. TO BAN 
HANDGUNS, STATEMENT ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT, S. REP. NO. 88-618, at 27 (2d 
Sess. 1982), available at http://www.consitution.org/mil/rkba1982.htm. 
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story of a transformative New Deal.  With this much done, 
many of us, and the Court especially might fairly say, that on 
the question of guns, America had said something important 
and perhaps decisive. 
It turns out in any case, that the rights reductionists 
cannot satisfy this burden.  What I have sketched here is the 
story of rights affirmation that I will elaborate in three parts.  
First, Section II will track the development of gun rights in 
forty-four state constitutions.  Section III will present the 
recent wave of state legislation mandating nondiscretionary 
licenses to carry concealed firearms.  Section IV will offer a 
short history of our modern debate about private firearms with 
attention to the rise and fall of the handgun prohibition 
movement. 
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A NATIONAL REFERENDUM ON 
THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO ARMS? 
Before it was uncovered that he fabricated some of his 
data,28 Michael Bellesiles won a Bancroft prize with a book29 
that supported what many in the academy and elsewhere 
earnestly believe: that the whole notion of an individual right 
to arms is a recent creation of the NRA;30 that historically the 
connection between Americans and their guns is more fiction 
than fact.31  Bellesiles claimed Americans never really had a lot 
of private firearms and the ones they had didn’t work very 
well.32  This implied no strong expectation of an individual 
right to have them.  The theory stalled because some of the 
records Bellesiles claimed to have examined were destroyed 
  
 28 Writing for the San Francisco Chronicle, Sam McManis captures the story.  
Sam McManis, A History Lesson for Historian: Archivist Refutes Claim of Prize-
Winning Author, S.F. CHRON., March 2, 2002, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/03/02/MN13172.DTL. See also Wikipedia, 
Michael A. Bellesiles, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Bellesiles (last visited Feb. 
8, 2006) (licensing information available at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html).  
 29 MICHAEL BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN 
CULTURE 9 (1st ed. 2000). 
 30 Id. at 9.  Sam McManis provides a quote from the New York Review of 
Books that reflects some of the sentiment.  “Bellesiles will have done us all a service if 
his book reduces the credibility of the fanatics who endow the Founding Fathers with 
posthumous membership in what has become a cult of the gun.”  McManis, supra note 
28 (quoting Edmund S. Morgan, In Love with Guns, N.Y. REV.  BOOKS, Oct. 19, 2000, at 
30). 
 31 Bellesiles, supra note 29, at 5. 
 32 Id. at 10-14. 
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before he was born.33  But for a quick moment his claim 
resonated strongly. 
If we were seeking a glimpse into the shadowy past, 
trying to shed light on some mysterious but long expired fever 
for private firearms, the fascination with Bellesiles would be 
easier to explain.  But why put such stock in what seems 
missing from musty estate records (fabricated or not) in the 
face of a solid two centuries of state constitutional activity 
enshrining an individual right to arms in language that brooks 
no debate. 
Our forty-four state constitutional arms guarantees 
have several implications.34  They say something about what 
the framers of the Second Amendment might have intended.  
Many state constitutions use language similar or identical to 
the federal Second Amendment, in a context where it is not 
plausible to say that the right of the people really means the 
right of the states.35  Eugene Volokh argues that the prefatory 
language of the Amendment, was a quite common form at the 
time of the Framing and shows how similar language appears 
in various state constitutions.36  But within Ackerman’s 
Dualism, the state constitutions do something more.  They 
answer the criticism that the Second Amendment is an 
anachronism37 at a level that transcends interminable policy 
debate. 
I will examine four eras of state constitutional 
enactments.  First, the era of the Framing.  Second, the 
nineteenth century before the civil war—post revolutionary 
enactments that suggest something about the common 
understanding of the Second Amendment by citizens one or two 
generations removed from its drafting.  Third, the nineteenth 
century post civil war.  And last, the modern era from the turn 
of the twentieth century forward. 
  
 33 Jon Wiener, Fire at Will, NATION, Nov. 4, 2002, at 28, available at 
http://www.thenation.com /docprint.mhtml?i=20021104&s=wiener. 
 34 NRA-ILA, Issues, Did You Know?, State Constitutions And The Right To 
Keep And Bear Arms, http://www.nraila.org/Issues/DidYouKnow/Default.aspx?ID=20 
[hereinafter NRA State Rights] (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 35 The fullest and most recent exposition of the states’ rights view of the 
Second Amendment appears in Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1075-87. 
 36 Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
793, 793-95, 814-21 (1998). 
 37 See, e.g., David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: 
The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 554 (1991). 
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One thing that distinguishes the state constitutions 
from Ackerman’s New Deal signals is they are not exigent acts.  
The New Deal may have been transformative.  But was the 
affirmation of FDR’s policies an exercise of considered 
judgment by the polity?  Or was it a floundering grasp by 
voters who were hungry, desperate and afraid?  In contract law 
the concept of duress invalidates decisions made under such 
pressure.  Politics is different naturally.  But in a theory that 
openly dismisses the procedural safeguards of formalism, 
exigency is one more thing to worry about.   
Constitutional politics in reaction to crisis defines 
Ackerman’s New Deal narrative.  The state right to arms 
provisions stand in stark contrast.  They offer the safeguards of 
formalism through compliance with the state amendment 
process and their span of implementation presents more or less 
continuous consideration of the private firearms question.  A 
practical advantage is that the Court already has 
demonstrated its willingness to use state constitutional 
provisions to illuminate federal constitutional questions.38   
Of the forty-four state constitutional provisions 
currently guaranteeing a right to arms of some sort, only three 
are products exclusively of the eighteenth century.  From the 
beginning of the republic, continuously through to today, the 
right to arms has been affirmed in state constitutions.  The 
counter trend, flat gun prohibition, is rare, appearing 
sporadically at the municipal level39 and in discrete ways 
mainly in the few states whose constitutions do not protect a 
right to private firearms.40 
For the most part I will proceed chronologically.  
However, to start, I will present in some detail the most recent 
of the state guarantees: Wisconsin’s 1998 Constitutional 
Amendment declaring, “The people have the right to keep and 
bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any 
other lawful purpose.”41 
  
 38 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) (state 
constitutions used in interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment);  Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969) (state constitutions used to interpret guarantee 
against double jeopardy). 
 39 See infra notes 365-66. 
 40 See infra notes 370-71. 
 41 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25. 
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A. The Case of Wisconsin 
Maybe it is no surprise that on the threshold of the 
twenty-first century the wild and open state of Alaska adopted 
a state constitutional right to arms.42  The same insight might 
explain West Virginia’s enactment of a similar guarantee in 
1986.43  More on these two later.  But how to explain 
Wisconsin—home to some of the most liberal enclaves in 
America and a center of progressive politics, the college town of 
Madison? 
Indeed it was in Madison that we find the catalyst for it 
all—a 1993 ballot referendum that asked voters whether 
handguns should be banned.44  It was the beginning of a story 
that might affirm the instincts of a Justice sitting in 
Washington, finding ambiguity in the Second Amendment, and 
wondering whether America has spoken loudly enough in favor 
of gun prohibition that arguments about an individual right to 
arms can be tossed confidently onto the scrap heap. 
And what if it caught on?  Madison times a thousand.  
“Madison” moving through the state legislatures—ten, twenty, 
forty and more states rejecting as arcane their dated right to 
arms guarantees and banning private ownership of some or all 
classes of firearms.  It would be a powerful constitutional 
moment.  And it might allow our pensive Justice to reject 
individual rights claims with the confidence that her decision 
reflected the values and tacit consent of a comfortable majority 
of Americans.  Within Ackerman’s model, it would make her 
decision closer to being right. 
So it is telling that the story of the Madison referendum 
spins out quite differently.  Madison voters (yes even Madison 
voters) rejected the prohibitionists’ agenda.  The handgun ban 
was voted down in one of the most “progressive” places in the 
country.45 
The people were obviously misguided, or so thought the 
Madison Common Council who within the next year enacted by 
a one vote margin, an ordinance that outlawed handguns with 
  
 42 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19. 
 43 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22. 
 44 See Christopher R. McFadden, The Wisconsin Bear Arms Amendment and 
the Case Against an Absolute Prohibition on Carrying Concealed Weapons, 19 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 709, 714 (1999). 
 45 Id.  See also Jeffrey Monks, Comment, The End of Gun Control or 
Protection Against Tyranny?: The Impact of the New Wisconsin Constitutional Right to 
Bear Arms on State Gun Control Laws, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 249, 300 & n.276 (2001).  
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barrels of less than four inches and required all other guns to 
be locked-up in a way that eliminated their utility for self 
defense.46  Several other municipalities around the state 
proposed similar provisions.47  Referendum failure or not, the 
ball was rolling . . . right up to the crest of the first small hill 
and then swiftly back the other way. 
The Madison-style restrictions touched off a firestorm of 
opposition.  In 1994, “elections swept into the legislature 
numerous pro-gun candidates who were angered and 
emboldened by various cities’ attempts to prohibit citizens from 
keeping or carrying handguns completely.”48  The next session 
saw the introduction of a constitutional amendment protecting 
the right to keep and bear arms.   
Wisconsin constitutional amendments must be approved 
in two consecutive legislative sessions before being submitted 
to the electorate.  In 1995 and 1997, the Wisconsin legislature 
twice approved an amendment protecting an individual right to 
bear arms.49  In 1998 Wisconsin voters were asked to adopt or 
reject a state constitutional protection of private firearms.  On 
November 3, 1998, the people of Wisconsin expanded their 
Constitution’s Declaration of Rights—something they have 
done only three times before.50  Both in the legislature and the 
voting booth, support for the amendment was resounding.51  
When the dust settled, seventy-four percent of Wisconsin 
voters had approved the Amendment establishing a 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.52 
Prohibitionists failed to make their case in Wisconsin, 
indeed they suffered a bit of a setback.  “We the people,” at 
least a clutch of them in the upper Midwest, voted to affirm 
  
 46 McFadden, supra note 44, at 714. 
 47 Id. (citing Keeping the Gun Lobby in Check, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, 
Nov. 14, 1994, at A6).  Binding referenda banning handguns was defeated in 
Milwaukee and Kenosha.  Id. at 714 n.26.  An advisory referenda was approved in 
Shorwood.  Id. 
 48 Id. at 709. 
 49 Monks, supra note 45, at 250 n.10. 
 50 Id. at 249. 
 51 See id. at 250 n.10.  Jeffrey Monks gives the details: 
In the first legislative session, the Assembly approved the proposal 79-19 and 
the Senate approved it 28-5.  During the next session, the Assembly voted to 
approve the amendment 84-13 and the Senate voted 28-4 in favor.  The voters 
similarly approved the amendment by a wide margin.  The final vote on the 
amendment was: “YES” - 1,196,622 (74%); “NO” - 415,911 (26%). 
Id. at 250 n.10 (citations omitted). 
 52 McFadden, supra note 44, at 709. 
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gun rights.  Our tired old Justice sitting in Washington now 
has a bit of data.  But there is more. 
B. The Other Forty-Three 
The message of Wisconsin is repeated again and again53 
across the nation as Americans vote in every era, under every 
circumstance, against a government monopoly on arms and in 
favor (costs and all) of private firearms.54 
Two revolutionary era constitutions are quite clear 
articulations of an individual right to arms.  They tempt the 
conclusion that our modern debate about the meaning and 
mystery of the Second Amendment is merely an accident of 
semantics.  Instead of prefatory language referencing the 
militia, followed by recognition of the right of the people, 
Madison would have saved us much trouble by offering 
something simple like Pennsylvania’s “The right of the citizens 
to bear arms in defence of themselves, and the State shall not 
be questioned.”55  
Least we conclude that Pennsylvanians of the era were 
confused or not seriously thinking about the whole 
militia/people/states-rights puzzle, there is the 1776 
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights that is less concise than 
the 1790 Constitution, but richer in detail. 
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves and the state; and as standing armies in the time of 
peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; And 
that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and 
governed by, the civil power.56 
This is less poetic, less intriguing than Madison’s 
language, but workman-like and clear about the people’s right 
to arms for defense of themselves. 
Vermont’s Constitution tracks the Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights in all respects except punctuation. 
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves and the State—and as standing armies in time of peace 
  
 53 Two states, Massachusetts and Kansas fall out of the count.  See infra 
notes 58-72 and accompanying text. 
 54 The Massachusetts and Kansas Constitutions discuss a right to arms, but 
their courts have concluded the right does not extend to individual citizens.  See infra 
notes 58-72 and accompanying text. 
 55 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 21. 
 56 PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XIII.  
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are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the 
military should be kept under strict subordination to and governed 
by the civil power.57 
Massachusetts followed in 1780 with similar language 
and a notable change.  Rather than a right to arms for defense 
of themselves and the state, Massachusetts declares, 
The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common 
defence.  And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, 
they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the 
legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact 
subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.58 
In the nineteenth century, this language was 
interpreted at least twice to guarantee an individual right.59  
But in 1976, the Massachusetts Supreme Court took a different 
view, ruling that the language was basically superfluous, just 
an affirmation of the state’s militia powers.60  Of the forty-four 
state constitutional arms guarantees,61 Massachusetts joins one 
other state, Kansas, in construing its arms guarantee to protect 
less than an individual right. 
The collective rights interpretation in Kansas is notable 
because many claim it is the first appearance of the “collective 
rights” interpretation in a judicial decision.62  The Kansas right 
to arms provision was adopted in 1859: “The people have the 
right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing 
armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not 
be tolerated, and the military shall be in strict subordination to 
the civil power.63 
In 1905 the Kansas Supreme court, in City of Salina v. 
Blaksley,64 rejected a challenge to an ordinance that punished 
  
 57 VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. 15. 
 58 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 17. 
 59 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 314 (1825) (right to 
arms is individual); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 44 N.E. 138, 138 (Mass. 1896) (right 
applies to ordinary citizens but does not protect armed parades). 
 60 Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E. 2d 847, 889 (Mass. 1976).  Outside the 
federal constitutional context, a collective rights interpretation posits the state’s 
protection of the state’s right to arms from the state.  This seems like an absurdity but 
in Massachusetts it is a reality.   
 61 NRA State Rights, supra note 34. 
 62 See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 
1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1510-12 (1998). 
 63 KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 4. 
 64 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905); Robert Dowlut argues in detail that the reasoning of 
Blaksley is flawed and not supported by the cited sources.  See Robert Dowlut & Janet 
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carrying of deadly weapons, ruling that the state right to arms 
“refers to the people as a collective body. . . .  Individual rights 
are not considered in this section.”65 
Compared to Blaksley, the Massachusetts 
reinterpretation is easier to criticize.  The Blaksley Court might 
well have been pulled away from an individual rights 
interpretation by an institutional memory of “Bleeding 
Kansas,”66 and in any case was not stepping on precedent.  The 
Massachusetts Court, however, had to overrule prior individual 
rights interpretations that were rendered during the same era 
the constitutional language was passed. 
Still, if the Massachusetts-style reinterpretation or the 
Kansas result had been achieved legislatively or by referendum 
and repeated in forty or so other states, in the midst of public 
outrage over the costs of an armed citizenry, it would be 
powerful evidence of a sea change in the constitutional politics 
of gun rights.  Our Washington jurist with her ear to the 
ground might fairly detect that the people had said something 
decidedly unfriendly about private firearms.  But within the 
Dualist model, without more, these two efforts suggest nothing 
more than the preferences of a few dozen old lawyers. 
True the citizens of Kansas and Massachusetts did not 
rise up and clarify things as Mainers did in response to a 
similar attempt by some of their judges.67  And as we will see 
later, Massachusetts joins the handful of states without right 
to arms provisions, in enacting some of the most stringent gun 
control measures in the country.  But even those efforts fall 
short of the program of prohibition to which a robust Second 
Amendment would be the only barrier and generally square  
with the sentiment of most Americans that they have a 
Constitutional right to keep and bear arms.68 
Kentucky addressed the gun question four times over 
the course of a century, starting with the 1792 declaration, 
“The rights of the citizens to bear arms in defense of 
themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”69  This 
  
A. Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 177, 187-191 (1982). 
 65 Id. at 620. 
 66 See generally JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL 
WAR ERA 145-69 (1988) (describing the bloodletting over whether Kansas would be 
slave or free). 
 67 See infra notes 111-14. 
 68 See infra note 394. 
 69 KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 23.  
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language was adopted again in 1799.70  By 1850 a provision was 
added permitting the General Assembly to enact laws to 
prevent carrying of concealed weapons.71  The current version 
reads: 
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent 
and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: First: The 
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . .  
Seventh: The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the 
State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to 
prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons.72 
Tennessee closed the eighteenth century declaring in 
1796, “That the freemen of this State have a right to keep and 
bear arms for their common defence.”73  The current provision, 
enacted in 1870 holds, “that the citizens of this State have a 
right to keep and bear arms for their common defense; but the 
Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of 
arms with a view to prevent crime.”74  The “common defence” 
language was interpreted in 1840 to mean that the keeping of 
arms was for militia purposes.75  In later elaborations 
Tennessee courts held that the militia purpose was consistent 
with the right of citizens to have ordinary firearms for non-
militia purposes.76  And in 1866 a statute permitting 
confiscation of individual firearms was deemed a violation of 
the Tennessee guarantee.77 
Enjoying both hindsight and firsthand knowledge of the 
founding era, citizens of the early nineteenth century began to 
fashion their state constitutions to guarantee an armed 
citizenry.  Connecticut’s “[e]very citizen has a right to bear 
arms in defense of himself and the State,”78 leaves little room 
for the collective rights arguments that afflict the modern 
debate about the Second Amendment.  Connecticut it seems, 
  
 70 KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 23. 
 71 KY. CONST. of 1850, art. X, § 23. 
 72 KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1. 
 73 TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26. 
 74 TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. I, §26. 
 75 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 157 (1840). 
 76 See Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 178-79 (1871) (the right to 
arms includes the right to purchase and maintain them and thus carry to and from 
home; the right to keep includes the right to use for ordinary purposes “usual in the 
country . . . limited by the duties of a good citizen in times of peace;” specifically 
protecting “the rifle of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket, and repeater”). 
 77 Smith v. Ishenhour, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 214, 218 (1866). 
 78 CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
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borrowed from Mississippi, which used duplicate language in 
its guarantee of an individual right to arms, first in 1817 and 
again in 1832.  By 1868, it became an entirely individual right 
with the reference to “defense of the state” dropped.79  The 
current version, enacted in 1890, declares: “The right of every 
citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or 
property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally 
summoned, shall not be called in question, but the legislature 
may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weapons.”80 
Indiana’s original provision was adopted in 1816.81  The 
current version, enacted in 1851, proclaims, “The people shall 
have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and 
the State.”82  Alabama recognized a right to arms in 1819, 
declaring, “Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defence of 
himself and the State.”83  Michigan is equally straightforward:  
“Every person has a right to bear arms for the defence of 
himself and the state.”84  Missouri followed in 1820 with 
language that bundles a right to arms within the basic rights of 
citizenship. 
That the people have the right peaceably to assemble for their 
common good, and to apply to those vested with the powers of 
government for redress of grievances, by petition or remonstrance; 
and that their right to bear arms, in defense of themselves and of the 
state, cannot be questioned.85 
Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, Rhode 
Island’s Constitution tracks almost exactly the parodied 
version of the federal Second Amendment.  In a cartoon that 
periodically reappears, a bumpkin wearing an NRA cap is 
sitting on a stool at the eye doctor’s office.  The full text of the 
  
 79 1817: “Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defence of himself and the 
State.”  MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 23.  1832: “Every citizen has a right to bear arms 
in defence of himself and of the state.”  MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. I, § 23.  1868: “All 
persons shall have a right to keep and bear arms for their defence.”  MISS. CONST. of 
1868, art. I, § 15. 
 80 MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12.  
 81 “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, 
and the state; and that the military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil 
power.”  IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 20. 
 82 IND. CONST. art. I, § 32.   
 83 ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23.  The spelling of “defence” was changed to 
“defense” in 1901. 
 84 MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 6. 
 85 MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 3. 
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Second Amendment86 is on the chart in front of him.  Wide-
eyed, he confesses to the doc, “I can only see the second part.”87 
That second part reads exactly like Rhode Island’s 1842 
guarantee: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall 
not be infringed.”88 
Now well beyond the hot-blooded revolutionary era, but 
on the cusp of the civil war, Americans continued to enshrine 
arms guarantees in their constitutions.  Ohio in 1851,89 Oregon 
in 1857,90 Kansas in 185991 (interpreted as a collective right in 
1901).92 
A bloody civil war, renegade rebel bands, dramatic 
changes in the federal Constitution and enduring bitterness 
prefigured America’s move into the modern era.  The last third 
of the nineteenth century brought dramatic adjustment of the 
American social contract.  Changes were made to the 
Constitution.  New rights were established for freedmen.  
Federal power expanded.  It was a prime opportunity to 
reassess the distribution of the machinery of violence.  It was a 
period when legislators and commentators made clear their 
views that the federal Constitution guaranteed an individual 
right to arms.93  And one when states continued to establish, 
  
 86 “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. II. 
 87 Cartoon on file with author. 
 88 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 89 “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but 
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up; 
and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.”  OHIO CONST. of 
1851, art. I, § 4.   
  This affirms and modifies slightly the 1802 rendition which reads: “That 
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state; and as 
standing armies in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be kept up; 
and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to the civil power.”  OHIO 
CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 20.   
 90 “The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, 
and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power.”  
OR. CONST. art. I, § 27.  
 91 “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but 
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be tolerated, 
and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.”  KAN. CONST. art. I, 
§ 4 (adopted 1859). 
 92 See City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (1905), for a discussion of the 
collective rights interpretation.  
 93 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1205-06 (1992); Stephen Halbrook, Personal Security, 
Personal Liberty, and “The Constitutional Right to Bear Arms”: Visions of the Framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 341, 432-34 (1995); David B. 
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reaffirm or strengthen their constitutional protections of an 
armed citizenry. 
Arkansas stripped the racist and sexist limitations from 
its original guarantee and nominally extended the right to all 
citizens in 1868.94  In 1870 Tennessee reaffirmed a guarantee 
that originated in the eighteenth century.95  Texas considered 
the question four times in the nineteenth century, establishing 
its current provision in 1876.96  Colorado’s guarantee appeared 
the same year.97  Georgia’s current guarantee dates to 1877 and 
establishes an individual right using operative language that 
tracks exactly the federal Second Amendment.98  In 1890 
Mississippi reaffirmed an arms guarantee that originated in 
the early nineteenth century.99  In 1895, South Carolina 
  
Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 
1433-47 (1998). 
 94 “The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep and bear arms for 
their common defense.”  ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 5.  This replaced the 
commitment “that the free white men of this State shall have a right to keep and to 
bear arms for their common defense.”  ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 21. 
 95 “That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and to bear arms for 
their common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the 
wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime.”  TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
  This language modifies the earlier guarantee enacted first in 1796 and 
affirmed in 1834, “That the free white men of this State have a right to keep and bear 
arms for their common defence.”  TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26, available at 
http://hclp.org/1796.html; TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. I, § 26, available at 
http://hclp.org/1835.html. 
 96 “Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful 
defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to 
regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime.”  TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23.  
This was preceded by similar provisions in 1836, 1845 and 1868.  TEX. CONST. OF 1868, 
art. I, § 13, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/hART01.html; 
TEX. CONST. OF 1845, art. I, § 13, available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/ 
constitutions/text/DART01.html; TEX. CONST. OF 1836, Declaration of Rights, art. XIV, 
available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/text/ccRights.html. 
 97 “The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, 
person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall 
be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the 
practice of carrying concealed weapons.”  COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13. 
 98 “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but 
the General Assembly shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be 
borne.”  GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ VIII.  This was preceded by a provision in 1865 that is 
identical to the federal Second Amendment and another in 1868 that also tracks the 
Second Amendment but adds, “but the general assembly shall have power to prescribe 
by law the manner in which arms may be borne.”  GA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 4, 
available at http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/con1865.htm; GA. CONST. of 1868, 
art. I, § 14, available at http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/con1868.htm. 
 99 “The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, 
person, or property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall 
not be called in question, but the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed 
weapons.”  MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 12.  The earliest rendition of the Mississippi 
guarantee dates to 1817: “Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defence of himself 
 
2005] CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 735 
reaffirmed its reconstruction-era guarantee.100  Montana,101 
South Dakota,102 Wyoming103 and Washington104 closed the 
century, all establishing arms guarantees in 1889. 
It is not, then, from thin air that the United States 
Supreme Court in the 1890s found and delineated a 
constitutional privilege of self defense in twelve cases that 
center on citizens using firearms to thwart attackers.  The idea 
was all around them.105 
So far, we still are talking about constitutional 
enactments at least a century old.  As we will see, their 
currency has been tested and their protections rendered vital 
in contemporary debates about concealed carry licensing.106  
But there is more.  The anachronism argument deflates 
entirely as we approach the state constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing an individual right to arms in the modern era.   
But there is something to consider first.  Notable by its 
absence is any state action the other way.  If the individual 
arms guarantees mentioned so far were indeed considered 
arcane throwbacks, part of the cause of avoidable carnage, then 
  
and the State.”  MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 23, available at 
http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/features/feature3/1817constitution.html.  This is reaffirmed 
in 1832.  In 1868, the language is changed to, “All persons shall have a right to keep 
and bear arms for their defence.”  MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 15, available at 
http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/features/feature8/1868 _state_constitution.html. 
 100 “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.  As, in times of peace, 
armies are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained without the consent of 
the General Assembly.  The military power of the State shall always be held in 
subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it.”  S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. I, 
§ 26.  The latter part duplicates the earlier version from 1868. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. 
I, § 28. 
 101 “The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home, 
person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall 
not be called in question, but nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the 
carrying of concealed weapons.”  MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 13. 
 102 “The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the 
state shall not be denied.”  S. D. CONST. art. VI, § 24. 
 103 “The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state 
shall not be denied.”  WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
 104 “The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or 
the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as 
authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body 
of men.”  WASH. CONST. art. I, §24. 
 105 See, e.g., Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 564 (1895) (A victim of 
violent crime “[is] entitled to stand his ground and meet any attack made upon him 
with a deadly weapon.”).  See generally David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases: How 
the Supreme Court Confronted a Hanging Judge in the Nineteenth Century and Taught 
Some Lessons for Jurisprudence in the Twenty-First, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293 (2000). 
 106 See supra Section II.A. 
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we might expect modern states to begin removing these 
vestigial provisions or at least having serious conversations 
about it.  State constitutional amendments removing outdated 
arms guarantees would suggest resolve to curtail individual 
access to firearms.  And similarly, modern amendments plainly 
establishing and protecting an individual right to arms, 
appearing in state after state, more or less continuously since 
the beginning of the republic, show an affirmation of the right.  
Quite a long moment indeed. 
We already have discussed Wisconsin’s 1998 
constitutional amendment.107  It replaced Alaska’s as the most 
recent of the modern arms guarantees.  Alaska amended its 
original 1959 guarantee in 1994.  The first sentence of Alaska’s 
1959 enactment duplicated the federal guarantee.108  The 
provision was amended in 1994 to add, “The individual right to 
keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the 
State or a political subdivision of the State.”109  Preceding 
Alaska was Nebraska in 1988, with language that seems to 
anticipate and dispense with every possible collective rights 
interpretation:  
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain 
inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, the 
pursuit of happiness, and the right to keep and bear arms for 
security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful 
common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful 
purposes, and such rights shall not be denied or infringed by the 
state or any subdivision thereof.  To secure these rights, and the 
protection of property, governments are instituted among people, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.110 
The over-engineered Nebraska provision perhaps 
anticipated the difficulty that prompted Mainers in 1987 to 
amend their constitution.  Maine’s original guarantee, enacted 
in 1819, provided, “Every citizen has a right to keep and bear 
arms for the common defence; and this right shall never be 
questioned.”111  In an environment where the “right of the 
people” is construed by lower federal courts as the right of 
  
 107 See supra text accompanying notes 44-52. 
 108 “A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” ALASKA CONST. art. I, 
§ 19 (amended 1994). 
 109 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19. 
 110 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 111 ME. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amended 1987). 
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states,112 it should not be surprising that judges in Maine 
interpreted the “for the common defense language” to connote a 
collective right and thus no right at all to anyone in 
particular.113  Mainers reacted with Yankee efficiency and in 
1987 amended the language to read simply, “Every citizen has 
a right to keep and bear arms and this right shall never be 
questioned.”114 
Alaska, Nebraska and Maine.  Not exactly centers of 
urban sophistication.  There is the temptation to dismiss these 
modern guarantees as the work of rural, fly-over states whose 
wide horizons give them the flexibility to make such mistakes.  
This theory is confounded when we consider Delaware’s 1987 
enactment.  “A person has the right to keep and bear arms for 
the defense of self, family, home and State, and for hunting and 
recreational use.”115 
Introduce Florida, one of our fastest growing and most 
populous states, and the fly-over dismissal becomes impossible 
to sustain.  Florida is instructive because it first granted 
constitutional protection of private firearms in 1838 and last 
visited the issue in 1990.  In the interim Floridians amended 
their constitutional right to arms language four times.   
The original provision was explicitly racist:  “That free 
white men of this State, shall have a right to keep and bear 
arms, for their common defence.”116  We might argue in the 
abstract whether this was an individual rights guarantee.  
Recall how “common defense” language fueled a collective 
rights interpretation in Maine.  But there was no similar 
judicial interpretation of Florida’s 1838 provision. 
The arms provision dropped out of the Florida 
Constitution in 1865 and a new one was added in 1868 
guaranteeing, “The people shall have the right to bear arms in 
defence of themselves and the lawful authority of the State.”117  
  
 112 The Ninth Circuit decision in Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F3d. 1052 (9th Cir. 
2002) is emblematic of these decisions and one of the only such cases to offer a detailed 
analysis of the issue. 
 113 State v. Friel, 508 A.2d 123, 125 (Me. 1986). 
 114 ME. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 115 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
 116 FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 21.  The 1865 constitution removed the 
guarantee.  FLA. CONST. of 1865.  It reappears and is reaffirmed in 1868, 1885, and 
1968.  FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (amended 1990); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 20; FLA. 
CONST. of 1868, art. I. § 22.  The basic right of the people “to bear arms in defence of 
themselves and of the lawful authority of the state” is established in 1868 with 
embellishment continuing through to the current form.  Id; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8(a). 
 117 FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. I. § 22; FLA. CONST. of 1865. 
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The next change clarified that the right was not absolute.  “The 
right of the people to bear arms in defence of themselves and 
the lawful authority of the State, shall not be infringed, but the 
Legislature may proscribe the manner in which they may be 
borne.”118  This language governed until 1968 when the 
qualifying language was changed slightly.  “The right of the 
people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of 
the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except 
that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.”119  
In 1990 this language was carried forward as Section (a) and 
joined by three new sections dealing with handgun purchases 
and concealed weapons permits.120 
New Mexico has addressed the issue twice in the 
modern era.  In 1986 it affirmed and supplemented its 1971 
enactment, to add a second sentence.  The full passage now 
provides: 
No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms 
for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and 
for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be held to permit 
the carrying of concealed weapons.  No municipality or county shall 
regulate, in any way, an incident of the right to keep and bear 
arms.121 
West Virginia’s 1986 provision is simple but clear.  “A 
person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of 
self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and 
recreational use.”122 
Then there is Utah two years earlier.  Utah is doubly 
useful.  Its original right to arms guarantee was enacted in 
1896 in language that if read through the same lense many use 
to interpret the federal constitution might be deemed an 
ambiguous guarantee of individual rights. “The people have the 
right to bear arms for their security and defense, but the 
legislature may regulate the exercise of this right by law.”123  
Most federal courts are steadfast that “people” in the Second 
  
 118 FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I. § 20. 
 119 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (amended 1990) (emphasis added). 
 120 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 121 N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6.  The 1971 enactment replaced the 1911 provision 
which read, “The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but 
nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons.”  City of Las 
Vegas v. Moberg, 485 P.2d 737, 738 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Montoya, 572 P.2d 
1270, 1273 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977).   
 122 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22. 
 123 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6 (amended 1984). 
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Amendment actually means some sort of governmental unit.124  
Utah’s original guarantee might be construed by similar 
alchemy as protecting less than an individual right.  The 1984 
amendment eliminates this possibility: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security 
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as 
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein 
shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.125 
Also in 1984, North Dakotans enshrined an individual 
right to arms in language very similar to the elaborate 
articulation adopted by Nebraskans in 1988:126 
All individuals are by nature equally free and independent and have 
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property and reputation; pursuing and obtaining safety and 
happiness; and to keep and bear arms for the defense of their person, 
family property and the state, and for lawful hunting, recreational, 
and other lawful purposes, which shall not be infringed.127 
Completing the list of 1980s enactments, Nevada and 
New Hampshire both established right to arms provisions that 
unequivocally guaranteed individual rights.  The Nevada 
constitution declares, “Every citizen has the right to keep and 
bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and 
recreational use and for other lawful purposes.”128  New 
Hampshire makes the same point slightly differently.  “All 
persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of 
themselves, their families, their property and the state.”129 
State constitutional enactments of the 1970s and earlier 
will strike different people differently.  For newly minted 
adults, the seventies are part of that obscure period of pre-
personal history.  But anyone old enough and attentive enough 
in the 1970s witnessed firsthand an important development in 
the politics of gun rights. 
By the mid-1970s gun prohibition was a bona fide 
political movement.130  Just a few years earlier, Democrat 
  
 124 See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2002).   
 125 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6. 
 126 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 127 N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 128 NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11(1). 
 129 N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2-a. 
 130 See infra Section IV. 
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candidates for president had joined the National Rifle 
Association.  John F. Kennedy, maybe just for show, was a 
member.131  In 1960 candidate Hubert Humphrey courted gun 
owners citing his personal commitment to the Second 
Amendment in Guns magazine: 
Certainly one of the chief guarantees of freedom under any 
government, no matter how popular and respected, is the right of the 
citizens to keep and bear arms.  This is not to say that firearms 
should not be very carefully used and that definite safety rules of 
precaution should not be taught and enforced.  But the right of 
citizens to bear arms is just one more guarantee against arbitrary 
government, and one more safeguard against a tyranny which now 
appears remote in America, but which historically has proved to be 
always possible.132 
We were on the threshold of conversations raising 
serious threats to gun possession.133  We were about to endure 
race riots, the assassinations of two Kennedys and Martin 
Luther King, Jr.  By 1970 we had suffered these collective 
traumas and had become smart enough to talk about root 
causes of crime and assign blame broadly. 
And still, the 1970s gave us more state constitutional 
amendments guaranteeing an individual right to arms.  The 
decade started with Illinois’ 1970 declaration that “[s]ubject 
only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”134 
In 1971 North Carolina reenacted language as old as 
the republic and tracking roughly its 1776 Bill of Rights 
provision. 
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed; and, as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to 
liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military shall be kept 
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.  
Nothing herein shall justify the practice of carrying concealed 
  
 131 See Letter from President Kennedy accepting an NRA life membership 
(Mar. 20, 1961), http://www.nramemberscouncils.com/jfk-nra1c.shtml. 
 132 Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth and Auxiliary Right, 
104 YALE L.J. 995, 998 n.10 (1995) (quoting Hubert Humphrey, Know Your 
Lawmakers, GUNS, Feb. 1960, at 4). 
 133 See infra Section IV. 
 134 ILL. CONST. art I, § 22. 
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weapons, or prevent the General Assembly from enacting penal 
statutes against that practice.135 
A growing state with burgeoning urban centers, North 
Carolina again confounds the fly-over theory.  But more than 
that, it suggests something about the interpretation of the 
Second Amendment in the Federal Constitution.  Deadly 
weapons were at the center of North Carolina’s 1776 Bill of 
Rights Guarantee: 
That the people have a right to bear arms, for defence of the State; 
and as standing armies in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, 
they ought not to be kept up; and that the military should be kept 
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.136 
In 1868 this idea was enshrined into Article I of the 
state’s constitution using language obviously borrowed from 
the Federal Constitution: 
A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed; and, as standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous 
to liberty, they ought not to be kept up, and the military should be 
kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil 
power.137 
The familiar first clause, say many lower federal courts, 
is a recipe for protecting states rights.138  All of the talk about 
militia’s and standing armies suggests a peculiarly military 
connotation to bearing arms (keeping arms remains a mystery 
that we must just live with).139  It is instructive then that in 
1875 (and carried through to 1971) North Carolina amended 
this language to add, “Nothing herein contained shall justify 
the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the 
Legislature from enacting penal statutes against said 
practice.”140  Important people evidently thought, even with the 
militia preface, “right of the people to keep and bear arms” 
  
 135 N.C. CONST. art I, § 30.  State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 1968) 
(discussing the history of the enactment). 
 136 N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, art. XVII. 
 137 N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 24. 
 138 See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court 
Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. 
REV. 961, 985 (1996). 
 139 Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 140 N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 24 (1875). The only change wrought by the 
1971 constitution was that “General Assembly” replaced “Legislature.”  N.C. CONST. 
art. I, § 30. 
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actually meant individual citizens with their own guns and 
decided that keeping and bearing should not automatically 
extend to toting guns concealed.  Of course it is also harder at 
the state level even to suggest as the federal courts have that 
“people” really means “states.”  Odd indeed for a state to 
protect itself from being disarmed by itself.  
Virginia also guaranteed a right to arms in 1971.  The 
guarantee was added to a provision originally enacted in 1776.  
The eighteenth century language echoed the federal Second 
Amendment theme, but did not contain an explicit right to 
arms: 
That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, 
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free 
state; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as 
dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be 
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.141 
The Louisiana Constitution offers a lesson already 
familiar from our assessment of North Carolina.  Its latest 
enactment was in 1974.  “The right of each citizen to keep and 
bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not 
prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons 
concealed on the person.”142  This language amended the 
original provision, which tracked the federal guarantee and 
finished with a qualifier that the individual right did not 
prevent the legislature from criminalizing carrying of concealed 
weapons.  “A well regulated militia being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms shall not be abridged.  This shall not prevent the passage 
of laws to punish those who carry weapons concealed.”143 
Rounding out the 1970s is Idaho, home of Senator Larry 
Craig who also sits on the Board of the National Rifle 
Association.  Idaho’s 1978 constitutional enactment (amending 
the 1889 version)144 is not surprisingly unambiguous in its 
protection of individual firearms and quite detailed regarding 
the legislature’s powers. 
  
 141 VA. CONST. of 1776, art I, § 13.  Virginia’s 1971 constitution added that 
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”  VA. CONST. art. 
I, § 13. 
 142 LA. CONST. art I, § 11. 
 143 LA. CONST. of 1879, art. III. 
 144 “The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense; but 
the Legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law.”  IDAHO CONST. art. I, 
§11 (amended 1978). 
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The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall 
not be abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of 
laws to govern the carrying of weapons concealed on the person nor 
prevent passage of legislation providing minimum sentences for 
crimes committed while in possession of a firearm, nor prevent the 
passage of legislation providing penalties for the possession of 
firearms by a convicted felon, nor prevent the passage of any 
legislation punishing the use of a firearm.  No law shall impose 
licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or 
possession of firearms or ammunition.  Nor shall any law permit the 
confiscation of firearms, except those actually used in the 
commission of a felony.145 
The remaining guarantees span the period from 1907 
through 1950.  Oklahoma’s was the first twentieth century 
guarantee.  Its 1907 enactment, still appearing before the first 
major federal gun regulation,146 and well before anyone had 
charged that the concept of an individual right to arms was a 
fabrication of the gun lobby.147  “The right of a citizen to keep 
and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in 
aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall 
never be prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent 
the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons.”148 
Arizona’s 1912 guarantee was long construed as 
authorizing open carry of sidearms, a practice that is less 
prevalent in the state now that concealed carry licenses are 
easily available.149  “The right of the individual citizen to bear 
arms in defense of himself or the State shall not be impaired, 
but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing 
individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an 
armed body of men.”150 
Missouri last addressed the right to arms in 1945, after 
first establishing the right in 1820151 tinkering with the 
  
 145 IDAHO CONST. art. I, §11. 
 146 The National Firearms Act of 1934 is discussed infra Section IV.A. 
 147 Warren Burger’s charge that the individual rights view of the Second 
Amendment is a “fraud” on the American people perpetrated by the gun lobby is quoted 
in Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Warren E. Burger, 
The Right to Bear Arms, PARADE MAGAZINE, Jan. 14, 1990, at 4).  
 148 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26. 
 149 See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 
1998  BYU L. REV. 1359, 1535-36 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (2001) (“The 
department of public safety shall issue a permit to carry a concealed weapon to a 
person who is qualified under this section.”). 
 150 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26. 
 151 “That the people have the right peaceably to assemble for their common 
good, and to apply to those vested with the powers of government for redress of 
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language in 1865152 and again in 1875.153  The current 
guarantee reads: “That the right of every citizen to keep and 
bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or when 
lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be 
questioned; but this shall not justify wearing of concealed 
weapons.”154 
Finally, Hawaii, whose modern gun laws are relatively 
strict,155 models the federal guarantee:  “A well regulated 
militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”156  
In State v. Mendoza, the Hawaii Supreme Court explained that 
interpreting this as both an individual and an collective right 
would be consistent with other state constitutional 
provisions.157 
The modern era constitutions prevent us from 
dismissing the eighteenth century guarantees as archaic.  They 
are also solid evidence of the currency of the right to arms.158  
Constitutional amendment is hard.  Easier of course at the 
state than at the federal level.  But still one of the most 
difficult things to carry off in a democracy.  Indeed, it may be 
the difficulty of constitutional amendment that fuels 
Ackerman’s effort to validate the modern regulatory state in 
the absence of an explicit amendment granting Congress 
  
grievances by petition or remonstrance; and that their right to bear arms in defence of 
themselves and of the State cannot be questioned.”  MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 3. 
 152 The only change in 1865 from the 1820 rendition is that “lawful authority 
of the State” replaced “State.”  MO. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 8. 
 153 “That the right of no citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, 
person and property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereto legally summoned, shall 
be called into question; but nothing herein contained is intended to justify the practice 
of wearing concealed weapons.”  MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 17. 
 154 MO. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 155 For example, Hawaii is one of a handful of states with legislation 
restricting certain semiautomatic firearms, what it calls “assault pistols,” but not 
traditional rifles. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 134-1, 134-8 (1993).  The Legal Community 
Against Violence lists California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, Hawaii, New 
Jersey and New York as having some type of restriction on “assault weapons.”  Legal 
Community Against Violence, Master List of Firearms Policies, 
http://www.firearmslawcenter.org/content/masterlist.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 156 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 157 920 P.2d 357, 363 n.9 (Haw. 1996). 
 158 Over the years these state guarantees have been used to declare a variety 
of gun restrictions unconstitutional.  See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Clayton E. Cramer & 
Schott G. Hatrup,  A Tale of Three Cities and the Right to Bear Arms in State Courts, 
68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177, 1180 n.12 (1995) (listing twenty cases from the 1820s until the 
1980s where various gun control laws were struck down on state constitutional 
grounds). 
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authority that seems inconsistent with the idea of limited 
federal power still enshrined in the text. 
Professor Ackerman tells a complex story of a 
transformative New Deal that ordinary citizens will find 
difficult to follow.  His claim certainly would be stronger had 
there been some plain language validation of this 
transformation through state referenda or constitutional 
amendments in language comprehensible to those outside the 
constitutional priesthood.  So what does it say to our modern 
Justice, looking honestly for constitutional moments, that 
seventeen states in the modern era have amended their 
constitutions to enshrine an individual right to arms in 
language beyond cavil? 
Federal courts and commentators have emptied the 
corners raising doubts about a federal guarantee to private 
firearms.159  It is peculiar that so many work so hard to fashion 
and expand other individual liberties from the meager 
constitutional text and when it comes to this one, work just as  
hard  to contract and eviscerate.  Chief Justice Burger 
characterized the individual rights view as a “fraud,” and the 
popular support for it as testament to dishonest but successful 
lobbying.160  But declarations of rights in state constitutions 
take much more than lobbying.  Most of these provisions were 
enacted long before the NRA came into existence161 and more of 
them were enacted before it morphed into a lobbying 
organization.162 
Warren Burger’s screed appeared in a Parade Magazine 
interview without citations.  Did he truly believe Americans 
had been duped in to believing they had an individual right to 
arms?  Did he realize they had been enshrining that very thing 
in their state constitutions more or less continuously since the 
beginning of the republic?  And what of those scholars 
searching earnestly for constitutional moments.  Is all of this 
state constitutional activity worthy of consideration?  Or is it 
  
 159 See, e.g., Denning, supra note 138, at 998-1004; Carl T. Bogus, The History 
and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 4-5 
(2000). 
 160 Holding forth in Parade Magazine, Warren Burger claimed the individual 
rights view is a fraud.  Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Burger, supra note 147). 
 161 See National Rifle Association, A Brief History of the NRA, 
http://www.nrahq.org/history.asp [hereinafter Brief History of NRA] (last visited Feb. 
8, 2006). 
 162 See infra Section IV. 
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flawed in some way that only can be detected by the elders of 
Dualist theory? 
Six states, Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
Minnesota and California, have no constitutional right to arms  
provisions (although New York has a statutory guarantee and 
as discussed below Minnesota has enacted the expansive “shall 
issue” style of license to carry concealed firearms, and Iowa has 
a liberally administered discretionary concealed carry 
scheme).163  Of these, California, Maryland, and New Jersey 
along with Massachusetts and the District of Columbia have 
enacted some of the toughest gun control measures in the 
country.164  And still these provisions are relatively benign.  
Washington D.C., Chicago and four of its suburbs, actually 
prohibit a broad class of firearms.165  California,166 
Connecticut,167 Hawaii,168 Maryland, New Jersey,169 New York,170  
and Massachusetts171—have restrictions on “assault rifles” or 
“assault pistols” that have invited much tinkering and 
modification of these obscure machines to meet regulatory 
guidelines.172  But practically speaking, with the exception of 
Washington D.C. and a few Illinois municipalities, the right to 
arms thrives.173 
Through war, economic crisis, domestic upheaval, 
someplace in every generation, Americans have affirmed the 
right of citizens to keep and bear their private firearms.  
Franklin Roosevelt won four terms as President and changed 
the political landscape.  But what is a stronger signal, votes for 
  
 163 See infra Section III.  Iowa permits concealed carry but retains nominal 
discretion over whether the permit is issued.  Id.  Minnesota also recently added the 
right of “hunting and fishing” to its constitution. MINN. CONST. art. 13, § 12.  For New 
York’s statutory guarantee see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 4 (McKinney 2005). 
 164 Open Society Institute et al., Gun Control in the United States: A 
Comparative Survey of State Firearm Laws, 3 (2000) http://www.soros.org/initiatives 
/justice/articles_publications/publications/gun_report_20000401/GunReport.pdf. 
 165 D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(4) (2001) (banning ownership or possession of 
handguns by any citizen who did not register a handgun by September 24, 1976). 
 166 Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 and the .50 Caliber 
BMG Regulation Act of 2004, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12290 (2005). 
 167 Act of June 8, 1993, Pub. Act No. 93-306, 1993 Conn. Acts 306 (Reg. Sess.). 
 168 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 134-1, -4, -8 (1993).  
 169 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-1 to -15, 43-6 to -7; 58-5 to -14 (2005). 
 170 Act of Aug. 8, 2000, ch. 189, 1999 N.Y. Laws 189.  
 171 Massachusetts Gun Control Act of 1998, MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121-
131P (2005). 
 172 See supra note 155. 
 173 See infra notes 369-70 (discussing municipal handgun bans in Chicago and 
its suburbs).  See also supra note 165. 
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president or state constitutional amendments?  What does it 
mean that these constitutional enactments have occurred 
continuously across the generations?  And how to weigh them 
against the fact that infringements of the right to arms on the 
other hand have been meager, not really prohibitions at all.174   
Ackerman offers no good protocol for weighing such 
things.  All one really can hope is that serious people will ask 
these questions for themselves and unlatch from their 
preferences enough to answer honestly. 
III. CONCEALED CARRY, STATE ACTION SIGNALS AND THE 
PROHIBITIONIST MOVEMENT 
By 1987, ten states had granted ordinary citizens 
licenses to carry concealed firearms for self-defense.175  Since 
then twenty-eight more states have enacted laws permitting 
citizens to carry concealed firearms.176  Most Americans, by a 
margin of 64 to 36 percent live in Right to Carry (“RTC”) 
states.177 
RTC laws differ by degree.  Two states, Vermont and 
Alaska, provide the broadest right to carry, simply by not 
prohibiting it.178  Alaska has a statute that has been 
interpreted to mean that no permit is required.179  In Vermont, 
  
 174 With the exception of the Assault Weapons ban of 1994, whose story and 
aftermath add texture to our enduring Second Amendment moment, see infra text 
accompanying notes 375-89, actual gun prohibition has not appeared at the federal 
level.  
 175 NRA-ILA, Issues, Fact Sheets, Right-to-Carry, http://www.nraila.org/ 
Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=18 [hereinafter NRA Fact Sheet] (last visited Feb. 8, 
2006).  
 176 Id. 
 177 See id.  Compare the margin of victory Ackerman claims showed broad 
endorsement of constitutional transformation through the New Deal.  A middle 
schooler serious enough about his coming duties as a citizen, grappling with the idea of 
unlisted constitutional amendments might go to http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ 
USArooseveltF.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) and learn that, “At Philadelphia in 1940 
the Republican Party chose Wendell Willkie their presidential candidate. During the 
campaign Willkie attacked the New Deal as being inefficient and wasteful.  Although 
he did better than expected, Franklin D. Roosevelt beat Willkie by 27,244,160 votes to 
22,305,198,” or 55 - 45%.  Our precocious teen might well conclude that 64 to 36% is a 
stronger signal. 
 178 NRA Fact Sheet, supra note 175.  
 179 ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.220 (2004); Alaska Department of Public Safety, 
Alaska Concealed Handgun Permits, http://www.dps.state.ak.us/PermitsLicensing 
/achp/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
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no permit is required to carry concealed weapons because no 
law prohibits it.180 
Alaska and Vermont are unusual.  The dominant model 
of RTC legislation has been dubbed “shall issue.”181  Under 
shall issue legislation, a citizen must be granted a permit to 
carry unless the state can show a particular reason (e.g., 
criminal record or mental instability) why she should be 
denied.182  Thirty-five states have shall issue laws.183  Three 
states have liberally administered discretionary schemes that 
operate in effect like shall issue statutes.184  Eight other states 
administer restrictive schemes that give the state basically 
plenary discretion to deny a permit.185  Some of these plenary 
discretion schemes have been afflicted with bias and 
cronyism—defects that prompted some of the movement 
toward shall issue laws.186 
  
 180 Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of 
Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 682 (1995). 
 181 NRA Fact Sheet, supra note 175. 
 182 Cramer & Kopel, supra note 180, at 680, 690-91. 
 183 NRA-ILA, GUIDE TO RIGHT-TO-CARRY RECIPROCITY AND RECOGNITION 2-18 
(2006), http://www.nraila.org/recmap/recguide.pdf [hereinafter NRA RIGHT-TO-CARRY 
GUIDE]. 
 184 Id.; NRA Fact Sheet, supra note 174 (Alabama, Connecticut, and Iowa). 
 185 See NRA RIGHT-TO-CARRY GUIDE, supra note 182; NRA Fact Sheet, supra 
note 174 (California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island). 
 186 See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 180, at 682-85. 
  Because we are generalizing about state laws that are not uniform, there is 
disagreement at the margins about precisely how to characterize every state.  Ian 
Ayres and John J. Donohue III criticize that John Lott has classified Alabama and 
Connecticut as “shall issue” states while Handgun Control Inc., calls them “may issue.”  
Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Nondiscretionary Concealed Weapons Laws: A Case 
Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof, and Public Policy, 1 AM. L. ECON. REV. 436, 437 
n.2 (1999) (reviewing JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING 
CRIME AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS (1st ed. 1998)), available at 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayers/pdf/lottreview.pdf. 
  The basic distinction for our purposes is states where an ordinary citizen 
can obtain a license to carry without any special showing other than a general interest 
in self-defense.  Thirty-five state laws are explicitly non-discretionary (“shall issue”).  
NRA Fact Sheet, supra note 175.  Alabama is technically discretionary, but is 
essentially shall issue in practice.  Applicants denied a permit in Alabama would likely 
be denied one in a shall-issue state for the same reason.  The NRA has called this 
“reasonable may issue.”  See NRA-ILA, Issues, Interstate Reciprocity and Recognition, 
http://www.nraila.org/recmap/usrecmap.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter 
NRA Right-to-Carry Map] (click on desired state to view summary of right-to-carry 
status).  Connecticut and Iowa operate a similar liberal discretionary or “reasonable 
may issue” schemes.  Id. 
  The NRA generally excludes states like New Jersey from the list of right to 
carry states, even though New Jersey for example grants a limited number (about 
1,000 in 1995 mainly to security guards) of permits. See Abby Goodnough, N.J. Law; 
Concealed Weapons: A Senator Says Their Time has Come, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1996, § 
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Commentators have designed intricate arguments that 
even if the Second Amendment was intended to protect an 
individual right, modern conditions are such that it can be 
fairly dismissed as archaic.187  This reflects a commonplace 
objection that America has outgrown the armed citizenry.  We 
have police now.  The militia is moribund and never was 
terribly effective.  Modern arms are way more dangerous than 
the eighteenth century flintlock.  And so on. 
So what are we to make of the fact that the concealed 
carry revolution, largely a phenomenon of the last twenty 
years, represents an expansion of gun rights beyond what was 
typical during most of the last century?188  Even before the Civil 
War, the few states that addressed the issue of concealed carry, 
did so by prohibiting it.189  One explanation is that open carry 
was legal and socially common.190  But that is not the entire 
story. 
  
13NJ, at 8. The full list of states with restrictive permitting systems are California, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and Rhode 
Island.  See supra NRA Right-to Carry Map, supra. 
  The four absolutely non issue states technically are Nebraska, Kansas, 
Illinois and Wisconsin.  Id.  However, Wisconsin’s inclusion on this list is now 
controversial since the Wisconsin Supreme Court has ruled that in some 
circumstances, the statute barring concealed carry must yield to “reasonable exercise of 
the [vintage 1998] constitutional right to keep and bear arms for security.”  State v. 
Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Wis. 2003).  In 2004, the Wisconsin legislature came 
within one vote of overriding the governor’s veto of a shall issue concealed carry bill.  
See infra notes 277-79. 
  For purposes of our count, I will start with the classification used by the 
gun control group Join Together Online. 
With the recent passage of a “shall issue” handgun law in Ohio, the number 
of states that have eased restrictions on concealed gun carrying has risen to 
35 [shall issue states].  But in the face of this onslaught, four heartland states 
are holding fast to their long-time laws that prohibit the carrying of 
concealed guns by people other than police officers.  [These four,]  Illinois, 
Kansas, Nebraska, and Wisconsin . . . stand apart not only from the shall-
issue states but from the 11 “may issue” states . . . . 
Dick Dahl, Four States Holding to ‘No Issue’ Handgun Laws, JOIN TOGETHER ONLINE, 
June 28, 2004, http://www.jointogether.org/z/0,2522,572284,00.html.   
  Adding the liberal, reasonable may issue/effectively shall issue states 
Alabama, Iowa and Connecticut yields the NRA’s thirty-eight right to carry states and 
the claim that “Sixty-four percent of Americans live in RTC states.”  See NRA Fact 
Sheet, supra note 175. 
 187 See generally David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen 
Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 551, 555-56 (1991). 
 188 See infra notes 313-14 (describing the commonplace restrictions on 
concealed carry at the turn of the twentieth century). 
 189 See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 180, at 681. 
 190 Id.  Other objections to concealed carry seem to have a more interesting 
source. 
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Beginning in the 1920s many states adopted model 
legislation based on the Uniform Revolver Act.191  Jeffrey 
Snyder details how the National Rifle Association endorsed the 
Revolver Act as an alternative to handgun regulations tracking 
New York’s more restrictive Sullivan Law.192  The Uniform 
Revolver Act prohibited concealed carry by unlicensed 
individuals.193  It was less restrictive than the Sullivan Law, 
which required a license for mere possession.194  Discretionary 
licensing schemes were built around the Revolver Act and that 
system explains a good deal about how we have thought about 
concealed carry historically.195 
The problem with discretionary licensing was that it fed 
cronyism, corruption, and class and race discrimination.196  
Often permitees were limited to the rich, famous, politically 
connected and white, even though more common citizens 
seemed to have equally or more compelling needs for self 
protection.197 
Early endorsement of concealed carry appeared in 
Vermont in 1903.  The source was not legislative but judicial.  
In State v. Rosenthal,198 the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that 
a Rutland ordinance barring concealed firearms was a violation 
  
 191 Cramer & Kopel, supra note 180, at 681.  See also David T. Hardy, The 
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 
585, 589-90 (1987). 
 192 Jeffrey R. Snyder, Fighting Back: Crime, Self-Defense, and the Right to 
Carry a Handgun, POL’Y ANALYSIS, Oct. 22, 1997, at 6-8, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display .php?pub_id=1143&full=1.  See also Don B. Kates, Jr., 
Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 204, 209-10 (1983).  New York’s Sullivan Law gun restrictions appear today at 
section 400.00 of the New York Penal Law. 
 193 Snyder, supra note 192, at 8. 
 194 See id. at 6. 
 195 See id. at 8. 
 196 See id. at 9.  Sometimes the courts were quite straight forward about the 
discriminatory intent of concealed carry restrictions.  Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 
703 (Fla. 1941) (Buford, J., concurring specially): 
[T]he Act was passed for the purpose of disarming the negro laborers and to 
thereby reduce the unlawful homicides . . . and to give the white citizens in 
sparsely settled areas a better feeling of security.  The statute was never 
intended to be applied to the white population . . . . and there has never been, 
within my knowledge, any effort to enforce the provisions of this statute as to 
white people, because it has been generally conceded to be in contravention of 
the Constitution and non-enforceable if contested. 
 197 See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 180, at 682-85; Snyder, supra note 192, at 
13-14. 
 198 55 A. 610 (Vt. 1903). 
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of the state constitutional right to keep and bear arms.199  This 
is the foundation for Vermont’s treatment of concealed carry 
today.200  Vermont law does not prohibit concealed carry except 
“with the intent or avowed purpose of injuring a fellow man.”201 
Washington state was among the group of states that 
adopted the Revolver Act throughout the 1920s and 30s.202  But 
in 1961 Washington switched to a shall issue structure.203  
Under Washington law, anyone who is allowed to own a 
handgun, also must be granted a permit to carry it.204  By 
1993 nearly a quarter of a million Washington residents held 
concealed carry licenses.205 
But it was not until the 1980s that the modern wave of 
concealed carry statutes appeared.  Many trace the impulse to 
Florida where in 1987 a shall issue law was debated under 
national scrutiny.206  The groundwork for the Florida legislation 
started in the early 1980s as gun rights activists and groups, 
including the Florida Chiefs of Police Association, pressed for 
legislation reforming Florida’s handgun laws.207  One piece of 
the proposed change entitled citizens who passed a background 
check and gun safety classes to obtain a permit to carry 
concealed weapons.208  Governor Bob Graham vetoed successive 
concealed carry bills.209  Graham was succeeded by Bob 
Martinez who signed concealed carry into law in 1987.210 
Florida settled in the minds of many some of the most 
contentious issues in the RTC debate.211  As a matter of theory 
one might concede how concealed carry could be basically 
  
 199 Id. at 610-11. 
 200 See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 180, at 682. 
 201 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (2005). 
 202 See Cramer & Kopel supra note 159, at 687. 
 203 Id. 
 204 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.070 (2003). 
 205 See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 180, at 689. 
 206 See David Kopel, The Untold Triumph of Concealed-Carry Permits, POL’Y 
REV., July 1, 1996, at 1, 9, available at http://www.policyreview.org/jul96/labs.html; 
Cramer & Kopel, supra note 180, at 690; Snyder, supra note 192.  For a detailed 
description of Florida’s concealed carry laws prior to 1987, see Richard Getchell, 
Comment, Carrying Concealed Weapons in Self-Defense: Florida Adopts Uniform 
Regulations for the Issuance of Concealed Weapons Permits, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 751, 
763-68 (1987). 
 207 Kopel, supra note 206. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Snyder, supra note 192, at 1; NRA Fact Sheet, supra note 175. 
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harmless in some rural state with a homogeneous population.  
But surely it is a bad idea for urban melting pot states.   
In the abstract, this is sound speculation.  But the 
experience in Florida proved it wrong.  A high crime state, with 
an often tense mix of ethnic groups, Florida had “all the 
ingredients for concealed carry disaster.”212  Observers were 
alternately surprised, chagrined and gratified that concealed 
carry in Florida is at worst benign and if one is convinced by 
the work of John Lott and others, produces substantial net 
social and economic gains.213 
  
 212 Cramer and Kopel supra note 159, at 690. 
 213 JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND 
GUN-CONTROL LAWS 11-12 (2d ed. 2000).  John Lott writes: 
Some evidence on whether concealed-handgun laws will lead to increased 
crimes is readily available.  Between October 1, 1987, when Florida’s 
“concealed-carry” law took effect, and the end of 1996, over 380,000 licenses 
had been issued, and only 72 had been revoked because of crimes committed 
by license holders (most of which did not involve the permitted gun). . . . 
In Virginia, “[n]ot a single Virginia permit-holder has been involved in 
violent crime.”  In the first year following the enactment of concealed-carry 
legislation in Texas, more than 114,000 licenses were issued, and only 17 
have so far been revoked by the Department of Public Safety (reasons not 
specified).  After Nevada’s first year, “Law enforcement officials throughout 
the state could not document one case of a fatality that resulted from 
irresponsible gun use by someone who obtained a permit under the new law.”  
Speaking for the Kentucky Chiefs of Police Association, Lt. Col. Bill Dorsey, 
Covington assistant police chief, concluded that after the law had been in 
effect for nine months, “We haven’t seen any cases where a [concealed-carry] 
permit holder has committed an offense with a firearm.”  In North Carolina, 
“Permit-holding gun owners have not had a single permit revoked as a result 
of use of a gun in a crime.”  Similarly, for South Carolina, “only one person 
who has received a pistol permit since 1989 has been indicted on a felony 
charge . . . . 
During state legislative hearings on concealed-handgun laws, the most 
commonly raised concerns involved fears that armed citizens would attack 
each other in the heat of the moment following car accidents or accidentally 
shoot a police officer.  The evidence shows that such fears are unfounded . . . . 
Id.  Lott goes on to make the more controversial claim that concealed handgun laws 
actually dramatically reduce crime: 
The difference is quite striking: violent crimes are 81 percent higher in states 
without nondiscretionary laws. For murder, states that ban the concealed 
carrying of guns have murder rates 127 percent higher than states with the 
most liberal concealed-carry laws.  For property crimes, the difference is 
much smaller: 24 percent.  States with nondiscretionary laws have less crime, 
but the primary difference appears in terms of violent crimes. 
. . . .  
. . . Criminals respond to the threat of being shot while committing such 
crimes as robbery by choosing to commit less risky crimes that involve 
minimal contact with the victim.  
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More broadly, Florida challenged the basic tenets of the 
prohibitionists, testing and refuting the Zimring hypothesis 
(that more gun possession automatically leads to more 
crime).214  With Florida’s refutation of the standard objections 
to RTC laws, the list of states adopting right to carry swelled.  
Currently shall issue right to carry is governing law  in 
Alaska,215 Alabama,216 Arizona,217 Arkansas,218 Connecticut,219 
Colorado,220 Florida,221 Georgia,222 Idaho,223 Indiana,224 Iowa,225 
Kentucky,226 Louisiana,227 Maine,228  Michigan,229 Minnesota,230 
Mississippi,231 Missouri,232 Montana,233 Nevada,234 New 
Hampshire,235 New Mexico,236 North Carolina,237 North 
Dakota,238  Ohio,239  Oklahoma,240 Oregon,241 Pennsylvania,242 
  
Id. at 47, 54. 
 214 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE 
PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 122-23 (1997) (“Current evidence suggests 
that a combination of the ready availability of guns and the willingness to use 
maximum force in interpersonal conflict is the most important single contribution to 
the high U.S. death rate from violence”).  The weakness of Zimring’s hypothesis also is 
illustrated by a simple chart that shows how gun crime in every category has declined 
even as the number of guns per 100,000 people has nearly tripled.  See GUN CONTROL 
AND GUN RIGHTS: A READERS AND GUIDE 61-62 (Andrew J. McClurg et. al. eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS]. 
 215 ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700 (2004). 
 216 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75 (1994).  In practice, Alabama’s RTC law works like 
the standard shall issue legislation.  As explained supra at note 186, Alabama is more 
precisely described as liberal discretionary. 
 217 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (2001). 
 218 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309 (Supp. 2005). 
 219 As explained supra at note 186, Connecticut is most accurately described 
as liberal discretionary.  
 220 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203 (2005). 
 221 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06 (West Supp. 2006). 
 222 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129 (2003). 
 223 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302 (Supp. 2005). 
 224 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-1 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 225 Recall that Iowa is, strictly speaking, liberal discretionary, but arguably 
shall issue in practice.  See supra note 186. 
 226 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.110 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 227 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 (Supp. 2005). 
 228 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2003 (Supp. 1995). 
 229 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.425b (2004). 
 230 MINN. STAT. § 624.714 (Supp. 2005). 
 231 MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101 (Supp. 2004). 
 232 MO. REV. STAT. § 571.090 (2003). 
 233 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-321 (2005). 
 234 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3657 (Supp. 2003). 
 235 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:6 (2002). 
 236 N.M. STAT. § 29-19-4 (2004). 
 237 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.11 (2001). 
 238 N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03 (Supp. 2005). 
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South Carolina,243 South Dakota,244 Tennessee,245 Texas,246 
Utah,247 Vermont,248 Virginia,249 Washington,250 West Virginia,251  
and  Wyoming.252 
It is fair to observe in all this that things might change.  
Just like preferences expressed through Article Five 
amendment, constitutional politics can shift.  But the most 
recent enactments of RTC legislation show, that after nearly 
twenty years of debate and controversy, the trend is toward 
more concealed carry, not less.   
Michigan enacted concealed carry in 2001 over sincere 
fears of blood in the streets.253  In practice, “it’s basically been a 
big ho-hum.”254 
[A] heated debate was raging about Michigan’s plan to make it 
easier to get concealed weapons permits.  One side said more guns 
would make society safer from violent crime while the other said 
making concealed weapons permits easier to obtain was surely a 
recipe for disaster.  Three years later, neither prediction has come 
true.  Law enforcement officers and local officials say Michigan’s 
streets are not safer—or more dangerous—than they were three 
years ago when the law went into effect.  But there have been no 
major incidents involving people with the permits.  No accidental 
discharges.  No murders.  No anarchy. . . . 
. . . .  
[Prosecutor David Gorcyca said] “Generally speaking, I’m not an 
advocate for more guns being out on the streets . . . .  [b]ut the 
statistics have shown there hasn’t been any more violence.  People 
are, fortunately, acting responsibly.” 
  
 239 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125 (Supp. 2005). 
 240 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.12(A)(12) (2002). 
 241 OR. REV. STAT. § 166.291 (2005). 
 242 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6109(e) (2000). 
 243 S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-215 (Supp. 2004). 
 244 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23-7-7.1, 23-7-8 (Supp. 2003). 
 245 TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-17-1351 (Supp. 2004). 
 246 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.177 (Vernon 2005). 
 247 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704 (Supp. 2005). 
 248 Vermont case law says concealed carry is protected by the state 
constitution. See supra text accompanying note 198. 
 249 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (Supp. 2005). 
 250 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.070 (West 2006).  
 251 W. VA. CODE § 61-7-4 (Supp. 2005). 
 252 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104 (2005). 
 253 See Korie Wilkins, Our Quiet Rise in Handguns, DAILY OAKLAND PRESS, 
June 27, 2004, http://www.theoaklandpress.com/stories/062704/loc_062712.shtml. 
 254 Id. 
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Because there have been no major incidents, many local officials are 
calling the law a success.255 
New Mexico adopted a shall-issue law in 2001 that the 
New Mexico Supreme Court declared unconstitutional because 
large municipalities had the option to opt out.256  In 2003 the 
legislature tried again, this time eliminating the municipal opt 
out.257  Opponents of concealed carry, resisted to the end, filing 
suit to have the law declared unconstitutional.258  New Mexico’s 
arms guarantee includes a caveat that “the carrying of 
concealed weapons”259 is not a constitutional part of the right.260  
Opponents claimed that this barred the new concealed carry 
law.261  The argument was frivolous and the Court unanimously 
upheld the legislation, explaining that the obvious impact of 
the constitutional caveat was to leave regulation of concealed 
carry to the legislature.262 
Missourians debated RTC for years before the 
legislature overrode the Governor’s veto to pass the Concealed 
Carry Act on September 11, 2003.263  Senator Michael Gibbons 
released a statement explaining his vote to override, which 
captures the drama: 
First, I need to address a rumor that the Republican Party and my 
future Senate colleagues have pressured me, threatening my 
leadership position or any further that I may have.  These rumors 
are absolutely false. 
. . . .  
 . . . Seven out of ten states have a shall-issue right-to-carry, a total 
of 44 states with some form of concealed carry.  Looking at these 44 
states, one finds some deterrent effect on violent crime with no 
  
 255 Id.  See generally Michigan State Police, Carrying Concealed Weapons 
(CCW) Annual Reports, http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,1607,%207-123-
1591_3503_4654-77621--,00.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (click on desired report to 
view pdf copy). 
 256 Baca v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 47 P.3d 441, 445 (2002). 
 257 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-19-1 through 29-19-13 (West 2005). 
 258 State ex rel. N.M. Voices for Children, Inc., v. Denko, 90 P.3d 458, 458 
(2004). 
 259 N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
 260 State ex rel. N.M. Voices for Children, Inc., 90 F.3d at 459. 
 261 Id. at 460. 
 262 Id. 
 263 H.R. 349, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2003) (since codified at MO. 
REV. STAT. §§ 571.100 through 571.121 (2005)).  See also Marc Powers, Abortion, Gun 
Bills Go Around Governor, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN, Sept. 12, 2003, available at 
http://www.semissourian.com/story/119469.html. 
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increase in violence, shootouts or harm to children because of 
permits. 
. . . .  
How close has Missouri been to joining these other states and 
passing a less restrictive bill?  In 2000, Governor Holden won by less 
than 1% of the vote.  If Jim Talent had won, a less restrictive bill 
would already be law, and in 2004 we may have a new governor who 
would make signing such a bill a top priority.  
Even closer, in less than two months, a pro-conceal carry candidate 
will be elected in the 11th Senate District to fill the vacancy caused 
by Senator DePasco’s recent death, guaranteeing a veto proof 
majority for a riskier bill. 
The passage of a shall-issue right to carry is inevitable.264 
As in New Mexico, the opposition’s last stand was a 
lawsuit claiming that the Missouri Constitution’s provision 
that the right to keep and bear arms did not guarantee a right 
to carry concealed weapons, actually barred the lawmakers 
from permitting concealed carry.  That action was dispensed 
with quickly and Missourians joined the growing majority of 
Americans who can bear arms in public for self-defense without 
breaking the law. 
Minnesota, home of Walter Mondale, the liberal 
standard-bearer who imprudently campaigned on the theme, “I 
will raise your taxes,” adopted a shall issue law in 2003,265 after 
coming close in 2001.266  Opponents of concealed carry made the 
familiar last stand in Unity Church of St. Paul v. Minnesota,267 
challenging that enactment of the law violated a constitutional 
requirement that bills deal with a single subject (the right to 
carry law was appended to a Department of Natural Resources 
Bill).268  A county judge agreed,269 and the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals affirmed.270  
  
 264 Remarks on the Floor of the Missouri Senate on the Occasion of the Veto 
Override Attempt (HB 349) September 11, 2003, http://www.senate.state.mo.us/ 
03info/members/d15/vetooverride.htm (statement of Sen. Michael Gibbons). 
 265 MINN. STAT. § 624.714 (Supp. 2005). 
 266 For a procedural history of the failed 2001 bill see Minnesota Legislative 
Reference Library, Resources on Minnesota Issues: Firearm Carry Laws, 
http://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/issues/firearmcarry.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).  See 
also Transcript of Interview by Jim Lehrer with Walter Mondale (July 29, 2004), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec04/mondale_7-29.html (where Lehrer 
uses the phrase “I will raise your taxes” to describe Mondale’s policies).  
 267 No. C-03-9570, 2004 WL 1630505, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2004), 
aff’d, 694 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2005). 
 268 Id. at *2. 
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In 2004, Ohio became the most recent state to enact a 
shall issue law after much debate and political maneuvering on 
all sides.271  What is different about Ohio is how the state 
constitutional right to arms forced the issue.  The Ohio 
Supreme Court in Klein v. Leis272 had concluded that a state 
ban on concealed carry was not absolute since by statute 
carrying a firearm for self-defense was an affirmative defense 
to an arrest for carrying a concealed weapon.273  Moreover, since 
the Ohio Constitution protects open carry of firearms, the 
restrictions on concealed carry were not a violation of the right 
to “bear” arms.274 
Citizen activists, who had been pushing a shall issue 
law for several years, took Klein at its word, and began 
carrying handguns openly in “‘Defense’ Walks.”275  By the end of 
2004, a shall issue bill, backed by police, was signed by the 
Governor who “had long said he would only sign the bill if law 
enforcement supported it.”276 
Finally, and again, there is a lesson from Wisconsin.  In 
1993 the prohibitionist movement was pressing forward with 
handgun bans.277  By 1998 Wisconsin had amended its 
constitution to block the gun bans.278  And by 2004, the 
legislature came within one vote of overriding the Governor’s 
veto of a shall issue concealed carry bill.279  The standard 
explanation for such a dramatic turnabout is NRA lobbying.  
But as the Wisconsin bill was nearing a vote, the Milwaukee 
Sentinel checked neighboring states and offered a report 
suggesting why reasonable people might support concealed 
carry without being brainwashed by the NRA: 
  
 269 Id. 
 270 Id.  
 271 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125 (Supp. 2005). 
 272 795 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio 2003). 
 273 Id. at 638; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.12, 2923.16 (Supp. 2005).   
 274 Klein, 795 N.E.2d at 640 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 275 Buckeye Firearms Ass’n, “Defense” Walks Make History in Ohio, 
GRASSROOTS ACTION GUIDE, at http://www.buckeyefirearms.org/modules.php? 
name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=60 (last updated Nov. 5, 2003). 
 276 Taft Signs Concealed Handgun Bill, NBC4I.COM NEWS, Jan. 8, 2004, at 
http://www.nbc4i.com/news/2751519/detail.html.  
 277 Wis. State Legislature Legislative Reference Bureau, Regulation of 
Firearms in Wisconsin, WIS. BRIEFS NO. 00-11, at 1-2 (2000), available at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lrb/pubs/wb/00wb11.pdf. 
 278 Id. at 3. 
 279 See Dick Dahl, Four States Holding to ‘No Issue’ Handgun Laws, JOIN 
TOGETHER ONLINE, June 28, 2004, http://www.jointogether.org/gv/news/features/ 
reader/0,2061,572284,00.html. 
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“I have never encountered a (threatening) event that involved an 
individual with a gun permit,” said Minnesota’s Hennepin County 
Sheriff Pat McGowan, whose county includes about 25% of the 
state’s population. 
. . . . 
Likewise, Iowa has had “a relatively good experience,” said Doug 
Marek, deputy attorney general for criminal justice.  “The system 
that we have in Iowa seems to be working well.”  Iowa allows, but 
does not require, the state’s 99 sheriffs to issue concealed weapon 
permits—a so-called “may issue” provision that is law in 11 states. 
. . . . 
“We have not seen in Michigan, that people get out their guns and 
start blasting each other.” said Matt Davis, of the Michigan Attorney 
General’s office.  “It appears the new law is working.”280 
Wisconsin does not yet have concealed carry.  But then, 
prior to 1998, it did not even have a constitutional right to 
arms.  That Wisconsin came so close so quickly to joining the 
38 other RTC states suggests that the idea of self-help against 
violent threats continues to resonate strongly across America.  
As this article goes to print, the press for concealed carry in 
Wisconsin has been renewed, with intense speculation over 
whether crossover Democrats will maintain their support of a 
new bill, allowing the override of Governor Doyle’s promised 
veto.281 
The objections to concealed carry legislation in 
Wisconsin and elsewhere, confirm that diehard opponents 
stand strongly against the idea282 (in 1940, Wendell Willkie got 
45% of the vote criticizing the New Deal).283  But despite 
zealous opposition, in one state laboratory after another, RTC 
has become law and nowhere has the standard parade of 
horribles appeared.284  The near twenty year wave of RTC laws 
  
 280 Steve Walters, Weapons Laws Not Matching Hype; Concealed Carry Not 
Altering Crime, States Find, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 2003, at A1, available at 
http://www.Jsonline.com/news/state/Nov03/182381.asp. The NRA categorizes these 
may issue states as “reasonable may-issue” (meaning that permits generally are 
granted) and “restrictive” may issue (meaning that special circumstances are required 
for a permit).  Iowa is considered a reasonable may issue state.  NRA Right-to-Carry 
Map, supra note 186. 
 281 See JR Ross, Concealed Carry Proponents Expect Full-court Press to Keep 
Democrats on Board, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 14, 2005, available at 
http://www.duluthsuperior.com/mld/duluth superior/13401571.htm. 
 282 See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 279. 
 283 See supra note 177. 
 284 See, e.g., supra note 213. 
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and their salutary aftermath refute many of the gun 
prohibitionists’ core propositions:  It is the gun, its easy 
availability, that will turn otherwise sensible and good citizens 
into murderers.285  You are 43 times more likely to be killed by 
your own gun than to use it in self-defense (84% of the deaths 
in this count were suicides—still a tragedy, but it does not 
support the popular image of Ward Cleaver coming home late 
and being shot by June in a fit of rage or panic).286  If attacked, 
  
 285 Don Kates has long argued that murderers typically have a long history of 
behavior that would bar them from legally owning guns and that those who seek 
permits for something that is quite easy to get away with absent a permit, present very 
little threat. 
The endlessly repeated argument for banning firearms is that “[M]ost 
murders are committed by previously law abiding citizens where the killer 
and the victim are related or acquainted”; “previously law abiding citizens 
[are] committing impulsive gun-murders while engaged in arguments with 
family members or acquaintances.”  “That gun in the closet to protect against 
burglars will most likely be used to shoot a spouse in a moment of 
rage . . . .  The problem is you and me—law-abiding folks.” 
. . . But every local and national study of homicide shows that murderers are 
far from being “ordinary citizens” or “law abiding folks.”  Rather, they are 
extreme aberrants, their life histories being characterized by felony records, 
psychopathology, alcohol and/or drug dependence, and often irrational 
violence against those around them. 
. . . The data set out in [that chapter] show that—unlike ordinary gun 
owners—roughly 90 percent of adult murderers have prior adult crime 
records, with an average adult criminal career of six or more years, including 
four major adult felony arrests. 
DON B. KATES, JR. & GARY KLECK, THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE: ESSAYS ON 
FIREARMS & VIOLENCE 11 (1997) (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted). 
 286 The 43 times more likely statement comes from Arthur L. Kellermann & 
Donald T. Reay, Protection or Peril? An Analysis of Firearm-Related Deaths in the 
Home, 314 NEW ENG. J.  MED. 1557, 1560 (1986).  The claim is a result of Kellermann 
and Reay counting 743 gunshot deaths in King County in Washington, which includes 
Seattle, from 1978 to 1983.  Id. at 1558.  For every case where a gun in the home was 
used in a justifiable killing, there were 4.6 criminal homicides, 37 suicides and 1.3 
unintentional deaths. Id. at 1559 tbl.3.  See also Stevens H. Clarke, Firearms and 
Violence: Interpreting the Connection, POPULAR GOV’T, Winter 2000, at 3, 9, available at 
http://www.iog.unc.edu/pubs/electronicversions/pg/pgwin00/article1.pdf. 
  Gary Kleck argues that the real mistake in Kellermann’s claim is the 
failure to include the millions of yearly defensive gun uses where no one is shot and the 
gun is not even fired.  See GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 
114 (Aldine de Gruyter 1991); Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: 
The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
150, 181 & n.100 (1995). 
  Gun control advocate Andrew McClurg, who finds suicides still a 
compelling reason for strict gun control, makes a remarkable observation: 
Most people are surprised to learn that annual firearm suicides routinely 
outpace firearm homicides.  In 1996, . . . 18,166 Americans committed suicide 
with a firearm, substantially more than the 14,327 victims of homicide by 
firearm the same year. Firearm suicides have exceeded firearm homicides in 
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it is best to just give them what they want and run.287  
Permitting anyone other than police to go armed in public will 
lead to blood in the streets, transforming fender benders and 
petty slights into deadly gunfights.288  It will be Dodge City in 
modern clothes.289 
The prohibitionists’ speculations, though not 
implausible in the abstract, simply have not turned out.  In 
state after state, shall issue laws operate in tandem with 
decreased rates of violent crime.  Even police officials concede 
readily that the nightmare scenario fortunately was just 
fiction.290 
The substitute war seems to be showing why John Lott, 
who famously contends that concealed carry laws actually have 
caused dramatic reductions in crime and billions of dollars in 
net social and economic gains, is wrong.291  This is remarkable 
given that the starting objection was that concealed carry 
  
forty of the sixty years between 1933 and 1992.  For all our fear of being 
victims of a violent criminal attack, “[i]f a randomly chosen person adds up 
the probabilities that each of the 5 ½ billion other people in the world will kill 
her, the sum . . . is still less than the probability she’ll kill herself.”  
Andrew J. McClurg, The Public Health Case for the Safe Storage of Firearms: 
Adolescent Suicides Add One More “Smoking Gun,” 51 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 960 (2000) 
(emphasis added) (quoting John Allen Paulos, Measuring American Society: A Better 
Chance You’ll Shoot Yourself Than Be Shot by Another, 6 PUB. PERSP. 17, 17 (1995)). 
  As for the Ward Cleaver imagery, Gary Kleck finds “fewer than 2% of fatal 
gun accidents (FGAs) involve a person accidentally shooting someone mistaken for an 
intruder.  With about 1400 FGAs in 1987, this implies that there were fewer than 28 
incidents of this sort annually.”  KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra, at 122. 
 287 See, e.g., PETE SHIELDS, GUNS DON’T DIE—PEOPLE DO 125 (1981) (writing 
as Chairman of Handgun Control, Inc: “The best defense against injury is to put up no 
defense—give them what they want, or run.”). 
 288 See, e.g., supra notes 213-14. 
 289 This imagery seems more myth than fact.  The bad men who hung out in 
saloons shot one another at a fearsome rate but for ordinary citizens Dodge City and 
other frontier towns were pretty safe places to live compared to many modern urban 
centers.  See DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY 327-28 
(1992). 
 290 See supra note 213. 
 291 See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, “Lotts” More Guns and Other Fallacies 
Infecting the Gun Control Debate, 11 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 139, 141-42 (1999) 
(arguing it is just impossible to isolate one factor out of thousands or millions and say 
it is the cause of reduction in crime), available at http://www.saf.org/journal/ 
11McClurg.pdf.  Lott would respond that criminals are basically rational, “when crime 
becomes more difficult, less crime is committed.”  LOTT, supra note 185, at 43-47, 51-54.  
In the second edition of his book, Lott answers many of his critics and makes additional 
claims—e.g., that mass public shootings fall dramatically after RTC laws are passed.  
See LOTT, supra note 213, at 100-03.  But see Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, 
Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1200 
(2003).  Compare Ayres & Donohue, supra, with Florenz Plassmann & John Whitley, 
Confirming “More Guns, Less Crime,” 55 STAN. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2003). 
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would turn a slow checkout line at Wal-Mart into a shooting 
gallery. (A tangential but interesting comparative development 
is that after enacting a flat ban on handguns, the British are 
experiencing a wave of gun crime that is unprecedented in 
their history.)292 
Of course within Ackerman’s model, the main thing is 
the two decades of debate and continuing votes for Right to 
Carry Laws.  The salutary results are really just back story—
practical endorsement of a wave of decisions that are important 
not because they are wise, but simply because they have been 
made.  Ackerman’s constitutional politics is a mechanism for 
determining America has decided something.  But it is no 
guarantee our decision is the best one or even wise.293 
Still, if the prohibitionists’ speculations had held true, if 
a few experiments showed concealed carry to be a really bad 
idea, it would have gained little traction in other states.  That 
RTC legislation continues to spring up across the nation 
suggests something about these constitutional politics growing 
up statewise that we cannot really say about the federal 
legislative signals in Ackerman’s story of a transformative New 
Deal. 
Purely federal constitutional politics really does demand 
that we ignore whether constitutional moments produce wise 
or foolish change.  The important thing is that “We the People” 
have decided on a particular course, and exhibited that decision 
in a way that is dramatic enough to be discernable to those 
looking for the right signals. 
But where we can track constitutional politics through 
successive experiments in our laboratories of democracy—the 
  
 292 News stories decrying this state of affairs abound.  See, e.g., David Bamber, 
Gun Crime Trebles as Weapons and Drugs Flood British Cities, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Feb. 
24, 2002, http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/02/24/ 
nguns24.xml (“availability of weapons - many of them from eastern Europe - is also 
increasing”);  A Country in the Crosshairs, BBC NEWS, Jan. 4, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1741336.stm (Britain enacted a flat ban on handguns in 
1996.  Today “no one knows how many illegal firearms there are in Britain, although 
estimates range from between 200,000 to several million.  Whatever the true figure, it 
is said to be growing daily”); Handgun Crime ‘Up’ Despite Ban, BBC NEWS, July 16, 
2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/uk/1440764.stm. 
  For detailed critique of the wave of gun crime following England’s 1997 
handgun ban, see Joyce Lee Malcom, Gun Control’s Twisted Outcome: Restricting 
Firearms Has Helped Make England More Crime Ridden than the U.S., REASON 
ONLINE, Nov. 2002, http://www.reason.com/0211/fe.jm.gun.shtml.   
 293 Once we are on the course set by a transformative New Deal, we have 
rejected alternative experiments.  It is pure speculation how things would have turned 
out under alternate models. 
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same proposition working its way through a cumbersome 
legislative process state after state, year after year for 
decades—we have not only evidence of mounting democratic 
assent, we also can assess whether the proposition is sound.  
As each test proceeds, the remaining states operate as a control 
group, allowing us to see whether the debated measure is 
better or worse than doing nothing. 
There is another slightly different advantage where 
constitutional politics grows up statewise.  It permits 
competition between alternative schemes.  So far I have 
discussed a dynamic where concealed carry bills either pass or 
fail.  But it is incomplete to cast the RTC decision as binary.  
Taking a slightly longer view of things, there was a 
third choice on the table.  The RTC wave appeared just a few 
short years after arguments for a universal ban on handguns 
had been pressed by prohibitionists and considered and 
rejected by a majority of Americans.294  So in addition to 
deciding yes or no about concealed carry, we also have seriously 
considered the possibility of banning handguns entirely.  With 
the exception of a handful of municipal ordinances, including 
famously Morton Grove, Illinois,295 and for the moment, the 
District of Columbia,296 this third choice has been rejected.297 
  
 294 Don B. Kates et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or 
Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513, 514 n.4, 515 n.5, 516 n.8 (1995) 
(pointing out scores of statements and official positions advocating a total ban on 
handguns and all firearms); ROBERT SHERRILL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL AND 
OTHER GUNS WITH WHICH AMERICANS WON THE WEST, PROTECTED BOOTLEG 
FRANCHISES, SLEW WILDLIFE, ROBBED COUNTLESS BANKS, SHOT HUSBANDS PURPOSELY 
AND BY MISTAKE, AND KILLED PRESIDENTS - TOGETHER WITH THE DEBATE OVER 
CONTINUING SAME 200-01 (1973) (describing congressman Abner Mikva’s failed early 
1970s bill to outlaw all handguns except for police and military).  
  Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), discussing the passage of the assault 
weapons ban that she authored, candidly admitted that the only reason she does not 
seek a ban and confiscation of all guns is that it is not yet politically feasible: “If it were 
up to me, I would tell Mr. and Mrs. America to turn them in.”  See ‘Hand Them All In,’ 
LAS VEGAS REV. J., Oct. 13, 1997, http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/1997/Oct-
13-Mon-1997/opinion/6211250.html (quoting 60 Minutes: Interview by Lesley Stahl with 
United States Senator Dianne Feinstein (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 24, 1995)).  
 295 See infra Section III for discussion of the failure of handgun ban 
initiatives.  While the city of Chicago and several suburbs have virtual handgun bans, 
the Illinois legislature recently enacted legislation that prevents a citizen from being 
convicted for violating the ban if he used the handgun for lawful self defense on his 
own property.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-10 (2005). 
 296 See Stephen P. Halbrook, Second Class Citizenship and the Second 
Amendment in the District of Columbia, 5 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 105, 105 
(1995). 
 297 In 1982 for example, California’s Proposition 15, which would have 
prevented any new handguns from coming into California was rejected 63 to 37 
percent.  See infra text at note 367. 
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Handguns were a natural target for prohibition.  Most 
gun crime is handgun crime.298  And while the gun death rate is 
generally dominated by suicides that might just as easily be 
committed with long guns, for the remaining deaths, it is fair to 
speculate that concealablity of the handgun was an advantage 
to the attacker.  The Supreme Court denied certiori in the 
Morton Grove299 case, extending an invitation to other 
municipalities to enact similar legislation and stirring a debate 
over whether the Court’s rationale was that the Second 
Amendment is not incorporated against the states, does not 
protect an individual right, or was just too hot to touch.  Still 
gun bans were rejected even in highly progressive enclaves. 
We already have seen that a referendum to ban 
handguns failed in Madison, Wisconsin.  As discussed in detail 
in Part III, statewide handgun ban referenda also failed by 
large margins in Massachusetts (1976) and California (1982).300  
By the late 1980s Josh Sugarman of the anti-gun Violence 
Policy Center lamented that Americans had lost interest in 
banning handguns and proposed a new strategy focusing on 
hitherto obscure category of guns he called “assault weapons” 
to breath life into the prohibitionists movement.301 
As discussed in the next section, Sugarman’s strategy 
had its own unintended consequences.  For now it is sufficient 
to recognize that we have previously but are no longer talking 
seriously about banning handguns.  The follow-up to that 
conversation has been a wave of state legislation enabling 
citizens not just to own handguns, but to easily obtain licenses 
to carry them concealed wherever they go. 
Ackerman’s point is about process.  But the extra 
confidence we gain from successive state experiments, about 
the soundness of permitting concealed carry, underscores that 
the higher lawmaking signals we garner from the concealed 
  
 298 For example, in 1999, handguns accounted for 7,950 homicides, and other 
guns accounted for 2,174.  See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, National Profile and Enforcement Trends over Time, 
Homicides by Weapon Type: 1976-2000, http://trac.syr.edu/tracatf/trends/v04/ 
weaptype.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).  
 299 See supra note 16. 
 300 See infra text accompanying notes 370-71. 
 301 See DAVID B. KOPEL, “Assault Weapons,” in GUNS: WHO SHOULD HAVE 
THEM 190-92 (1995) (“Josh Sugarman authored the November 1988 strategy memo 
suggesting that the press and the public had lost interest in handgun control.  He 
counseled the anti-gun lobby to switch to the ‘assault weapon’ issue, which the lobby 
did with spectacular success in 1989.”).  See discussion infra notes 377-81. 
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carry revolution are in an important way better than those 
Ackerman uses to expand the implications of the New Deal. 
IV. A CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERATIONS 
Professor Ackerman builds the case for his Dualist 
model by criticizing the alternatives.  The Burkean, a pure 
democrat, worships at the alter of the present and would cede 
the field to whatever majority holds sway.  The Foundationalist 
hopes to construct a principled constitutional platform and by 
pursuing this normative vision of the good, would freely 
restrain majority will.  The Dualist incorporates both and is 
hindered by neither; tempering each with the type of 
understanding reached after “a good conversation. . . .  between 
generations.”302 
We are today a nation where between 40 and 50 percent 
of households have at least one gun.303  Guns in private hands 
number about a quarter billion.304  We fire nearly four billion 
rounds downrange every year (most of those recreationally).305  
We sustain around 30,000 firearms deaths per year.306  The 
majority of these are suicides.  Gun control advocate Andrew 
McClurg reports, “Most people are surprised to learn that 
annual firearm suicides routinely outpace firearm homicides.  
In 1996 . . . 18,166 Americans committed suicide with a 
firearm, substantially more than the 14,327 victims of homicide 
by firearm the same year.”307  Guns are used in over half of 
  
 302 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 477-78. 
 303 In 1986, Wright and Rossi put the gun ownership percentage at half of all 
households, JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED 
DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 143 (1986).  Other estimates 
have been as low as forty percent.  See GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS, supra note 214, 
at 1. 
 304 See GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS, supra note 214, at 1. 
 305 See GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 86 
(1997). 
 306 See GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS, supra note 214, at 60.  Taking 1997 as 
a source of uncontroversial numbers, firearms were estimated to have caused over 
32,000 deaths (this number includes both criminal and lawful shootings).  Id. 
 307 Andrew J. McClurg, The Public Health Case for the Safe Storage of 
Firearms: Adolescent Suicides Add One More “Smoking Gun,” 51 HASTINGS L. J. 953, 
960 (2000) “Firearm suicides have exceeded firearm homicides in forty of the sixty 
years between 1933 and 1992.”  Id. (citing Garen Wintemute et al., The Choice of 
Weapons in Firearms Suicides, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 824, 824 (1988)). 
  Some will think it is odd and misleading to report firearms deaths without 
highlighting that most are suicides.  The suicide deaths seem more comparable to the 
estimated 400,000 preventable deaths from obesity, see Gina Kolata, Data on Death 
from Obesity is Inflated, U.S. Agency Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at A5, or the 
nearly 420,000  from cigarette smoking, see Center for Disease Control, Tobacco 
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domestic homicides, resulting in about 1,800 murders 
annually.308  Accidental deaths are typically the smallest 
fraction of American gun deaths and those where children are 
victims smaller still.309  In 1993 for example, “119 children 
under the age of 13, including 30 under the age of 5 were killed 
in [firearms] accidents . . . .”310  Depending on which studies we 
credit, Americans use guns defensively on the order of more 
than two million times per year, around 700,000 times a year, 
or around 75,000 times a year.311  Fourteen million Americans 
routinely carry guns when they go out.312 
This says something about the costs and character of 
our armed society, but in full context, the inter-generational 
conversation Ackerman solicits presents a bit of a problem.  
Looking across our history, America has spoken quite a lot and 
loudly about guns.  But relatively little of that has been about 
gun prohibition.  As we have seen, from the Framing through 
Reconstruction to the modern era, the principle work in the 
states has been about acknowledging the right of individuals to 
keep and bear private firearms.  There is no equivalent, large-
scale public decision-making from these periods that endorses 
the prohibitionist agenda.313  The work of standard model 
  
Information and Prevention Source (TIPS), Cigarette Smoking-Related Mortality, 
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/research_data/health_consequences/mortali.htm (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2006).  The homicides seem more like the carnage inflicted by drunk 
drivers (about 17,000 deaths per year).  See Drunken Driving Deaths Drop, CBS NEWS 
(Aug. 25, 2004), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/25/national/ 
main638544.shtml.  Between 1997 and 2002, an average of 57 children under 14 were 
killed in firearms accidents each year.  See Common Sense about Kids and Guns, 
National Firearms Deaths, http://www.kidsandguns.org/study_deaths.asp?National 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 308 GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS, supra note 214, at 74. 
 309 For 2002 the CDC reports 11,829 firearms homicides, and 17,108 firearms 
suicides.  Center for Disease Control, National Center for Health Statistics, fast stats A 
to Z, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats (follow “Homicide/Assault” and “Suicide/Self-
Inflicted Injury” hyperlinks).  This is in addition to accidental firearms deaths.  During 
the same year 16,257 people died in unintentional falls and 17,550 died by accidental 
poisoning.  Id. (follow “Accidents/Unintentional Injuries” hyperlink). 
 310 KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 305, at 299.  The highest number of 
accidental shooting deaths in one year was 3,014 in 1933.  Id. at 323 tbl.9.2.  Since 
1973 (with 2,618 fatal gun accidents) the number has declined nearly every year.  Id.  
In 1998 there were 900.  NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 9 (1999).  In 80 of 
these the victim was age 5-14.  Id.  30 victims were under the age of 5.  Id. 
 311 See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 305, at 151-54 (reporting his 
findings and those of other studies). 
 312 Philip J. Cook et al., The Gun Debate’s New Mythical Number: How Many 
Defensive Uses Per Year?, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 463, 467 (1997) (“14 million 
people routinely carry [a gun] when they go out.”). 
 313 See generally Bogus, supra note 159. 
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scholars parallels this argument.314  Even the opposition to the 
standard model scholarship is basically reactive, limited to 
alternative explanations of the evidence offered by standard 
modelers.315 
  
 314 After discussing the rich originalist support for the individual rights view, 
William Van Alstyne underscores the point this way: 
In recent years it has been suggested that the Second Amendment protects 
the “collective” right of states to maintain militias, while it does not protect 
the right of “the people” to keep and bear arms.  If anyone entertained this 
notion in the period during which the Constitution and Bill of Rights were 
debated and ratified, it remains one of the most closely guarded secrets of the 
eighteenth century, for no known writing surviving from the period between 
1787 and 1791 states such a thesis. 
William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 
DUKE L.J. 1236, 1243 n.19 (1994) (emphasis added) (quoting STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, 
THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 83 (1984)).  
See also Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 
(1989); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. 
REV. 1 (1996). 
  For nineteenth century support of the individual right, see generally David 
B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359. 
  For support of the individual right during the Reconstruction Era see 
Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal Security, Personal Liberty, and “The Constitutional 
Right to Bear Arms”: Visions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON 
HALL CONST. L.J. 341, 431-34 (1995) (providing a detailed account of debates 
confirming congressional intent to incorporate the individual rights view of the Second 
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. 
Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 
GEO. L.J. 309, 342-48 (1991) (discussing the influence that Southern attempts to 
disarm the newly freed slaves had on the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
subsequent Supreme Court cases); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1260-62 (1992) (documenting through 
floor speeches that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to protect 
generally the freedoms in the Bill of Rights, including the right to keep and bear arms); 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1167-68 
(1991) (explaining that key framers of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the right to 
keep and bear arms, unlike other constitutional provisions, as a “privilege of national 
citizenship” that applied against the states).  See also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
393, 417 (1857) (explaining that if free blacks were deemed citizens they would have 
commensurate rights including the right “to keep and carry arms wherever they 
went”). 
 315 See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment: 
A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737 (1995) (the authors, standard 
modelers, illustrate some of the worrisome policy results of pressing the collective 
rights view of the Second Amendment very far, and suggest that collective rights 
scholars haven’t really taken collective rights seriously, advancing it just as a 
makeweight).  For a suggestion of how the collective rights view realistically  might 
spin out in problematic ways, see Nicholas J. Johnson, Testing the States Rights Second 
Amendment, A Showdown between Federal Environmental Closure of Firing Ranges 
and Protective State Legislation, 38 IND. L. REV. 689 (2005). 
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It is not uncommon to find early municipal restrictions 
on carrying and use of handguns,316 some of which seemed to 
have racist motivations.317  But in terms of the broad public 
stirrings, decisions by the people on the order of state 
constitutional amendments or votes for a chief executive that 
Ackerman says are signals of higher lawmaking, there is really 
very little discussion about prohibition until quite late in the 
game. 
The first major federal gun control law did not appear 
until more than fifty years after the founding of the National 
Rifle Association.318  Formed in 1871 by two Union officers who 
lamented the generally poor marksmanship of their Civil War 
troops, the National Rifle Association was established to 
“promote and encourage rifle shooting on a scientific basis.”319  
Progress was plodding and the organization even suspended 
operations from 1892-1900.320 
In 1904, advancing the idea of America as a nation of 
riflemen, Congress established the Civilian Marksmanship 
Program (“CMP”)  for the purpose of promoting shooting clubs, 
national shooting competitions, and encouraging civilian 
training and practice with military arms.321  Through a 
cooperative arrangement between the CMP and (for over fifty 
years) the NRA, citizens were able to purchase government 
surplus army rifles and handguns, including semiautomatic 
battle rifles that some would call assault rifles.  Practical 
support for shooters remained the NRA’s central mission 
through the 1950s.  The CMP though now detached from the 
NRA, continues its original mission, much to the chagrin of 
  
 316 David Hardy writes:  
The first American handgun ban was enacted in 1837 [voided as a violation of 
the federal Second Amendment in Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846)], 
restrictions on sale or carrying of handguns were commonplace by the turn of 
the century, and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws spent seven years in the 1920s preparing a uniform state act on the 
subject. 
Hardy, supra note 191, at 589 (internal citations omitted). 
 317 See Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 17 (1995). 
 318 Hardy, supra note 191, at 589-90 (“[P]rior to 1934, the sole federal statute 
on the subject was a 1927 ban on the use of the mails to ship firearms concealable on 
the person.”). 
 319 See Brief History of NRA, supra note 161. 
 320 See SHERRILL, supra note 294, at 212. 
 321 See Civilian Marksmanship Program, About the CMP, 
http://www.odcmp.com/about_us.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
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some,322 and recently marked 100 years of providing Americans 
with surplus military arms and marksmanship training.323 
It was not until 1904, writes Robert Sherrill, with the 
creation of the CMP that the NRA really became viable.  
Sherrill, who is deeply critical of both the NRA and the CMP, 
writes this: 
In 1903, under the heavy handed encouragement of Secretary Root 
and key generals, Congress was persuaded to permit the NRA to get 
its hands officially into the U.S. Treasury; this came about via the 
establishment of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle 
Practice, which, at its very first meetings, voted to turn over literally 
every available military shooting installation plus all available 
surplus weapons to the promotion of the NRA. 
By 1910 the War Department began supplying the NRA with cut-
rate weapons. Having adopted the Model 1903 Springfield as the 
official infantry arm, the department declared the Model 1898 Krag 
as surplus and let NRA members have them for $10 each, plus costs.  
NRA officials concede that this “greatly advanced” the NRA because 
this was the first time that the government used the riflemen as its 
outlet for used weapons.  Thereafter the NRA could advertise that it 
  
 322 See John Mintz, M-1 Rifle Giveaway Riles Gun Control Proponents, PLAIN 
DEALER (Cleveland), May 9, 1996, at A14.  For a highly critical, often humorous, 
informative critique of the CMP, see SHERRILL supra note 294, at 221-22.  Sherrill 
writes: 
[F]inally [the National Defense Act of 1916] created the Office of the Director 
of Civilian Marksmanship under the National Board for the Promotion of 
Rifle Practice—a bureaucratic enclave that was to swell eventually into two 
dozen civilian employees and three colonels, supervised by the twenty-five-
member Board itself (most of whose members belong to the NRA), and 
operating on a budget of $5 million. . . .  There was considerable grousing 
among critics of the NRA when, at the height of the Vietnam War and the 
drafting of record numbers of men to fight an unpopular war, the Pentagon 
was assigning three thousand servicemen to provide housekeeping services at 
Camp Perry for the NRA devotees.  The Perry matches alone cost taxpayers 
$2 million. . . .  And did the federal support of this manly hobby pay off in a 
better-trained citizenry on which the military forces could draw?  Alas, not 
exactly.  In fact the [CMP] was of insignificant value [according to a 1965 
study] at a cost of $100,000 to the taxpayer.  In a sampling of 12,880 Army 
trainees . . . only 3.1 percent had been in the [CMP] before being inducted 
into the army.  The study further showed that some gun club members had 
received no instruction at all and that some had never shot a gun.  Perhaps 
the most embarrassing discovery was that fewer than half of the gun club 
members benefiting from the government program were of draftable age.  
Id.  Sherrill’s book is anything but an endorsement of an armed society.  But his 
description of the CMP is useful.  Remember that lots of people did not like the New 
Deal either.  See supra note 177. 
 323 In 1994 the program was transformed from one funded out of the federal 
budget to a federal corporation that must sustain itself financially.  It still promotes 
marksmanship training and sells surplus semiautomatic battle rifles to qualified 
citizens.  See 36 U.S.C. § 40729 (2000). 
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paid to sign up.  Only NRA members got the guns.  Only NRA 
members got the free ammunition.  Only NRA members got the free 
trips to shooting matches. 
. . . .  
. . .  [In 1916 the National Defense Act] authored primarily by 
Secretary [of War] Root . . . incorporated into government policy all 
the ad-hoc favoritism of previous years: $300,000 dollars—an 
enormous sum for 1916—was set aside to promote civilian 
marksmanship training; the War Department was authorized to 
keep handing out guns and ammo to civilian rifle clubs; military 
instructors were made available to the NRA hobbyist; all military 
rifle ranges were opened to civilian gunmen; finally it created the 
Office of the Directory of Civilian Marksmanship under the National 
Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice . . . .324 
Sherrill brings the disgust of a modern gun control 
advocate to his description of the NRA’s partnership with the 
federal government.  But realize this is his disgust circa 1973.  
Nothing in his account and nothing I can find suggests any 
general sympathy at the turn of the century for Sherrill’s 
views.  There was as yet, no Coalition to Ban Handguns, 
Violence Policy Center or Handgun Control, Inc.—no 
prohibitionist movement to speak of. 
The first major federal firearms regulation was the 
National Firearms Act of 1934 which subjected destructive 
weapons—e.g., full automatic firearms, short barreled rifles 
and shotguns, and silencers—to a two hundred dollar tax and 
registration enabling the tax.325  These firearms remain 
available today under basically the same scheme of 
regulation.326 
The 1934 Act was limited to a narrow class of 
destructive weapons.327  Still under consideration was 
regulation of the trade in ordinary firearms.  The Federal 
Firearms Act of 1938 established a system of licenses for 
firearms dealers.328  The one-dollar license was required only 
for dealers who traded firearms in interstate or foreign 
commerce.329  These dealers were required to keep a record of 
their sales and were prohibited from shipping guns across state 
  
 324 SHERRILL, supra note 294, at 219-21. 
 325 National Firearms Act of 1934 §§ 3-5, Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 
(codified as 26 U.S.C. § 5801 (2000)). 
 326 See National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5611, 5841 (2000). 
 327 National Firearms Act of 1934 § 1(a). 
 328 Hardy, supra note 191, at 594. 
 329 Id. 
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lines to violent felons or to anyone prohibited from receiving a 
firearm by the laws of the destination state.330 
This was the state of federal gun law when the Supreme 
Court took the case that stands as its only direct treatment of 
the Second Amendment.  It was a violation of the 1934 Gun 
Control Act that set up the Court’s decision in U.S. v. Miller.331  
Miller, a bootlegger, was arrested for possession of an 
unregistered sawed-off shotgun.332  He claimed that the 1934 
Act was a violation of the Second Amendment.333  When the 
case finally reached the Supreme Court, Miller had 
disappeared.  The government argued its case unopposed.334 
Part of the Miller opinion focused on whether the gun 
had a reasonable relationship to preservation of a well 
regulated militia.335  Unable to conclude that it did, the Court 
ruled, “[W]e cannot say that the Second Amendment 
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”336  
This prompts claims that the right is a collective or state right.  
But then the Court explains that the “militia” consists of 
the general citizenry bearing “arms supplied by themselves and 
of the kind in common use at the time” and ignores that Miller 
was not part of any organized military unit.  This part of the 
decision fuels individual rights claims.337  This duality in Miller 
is underscored by the vacillating opinions of the executive 
branch about the meaning of the Second Amendment,338 and 
leaves us today unable to say conclusively whether the right is 
individual or not. 
  
 330 Id. at 594.  For a rich description of the details and political maneuvering 
leading to passage of the bill, see id. at 585-627. 
 331 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 332 Id. at 175. 
 333 Id. at 176. 
 334 ROBERT J. COTTROL, GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION xxvii (Garland 
1993). 
 335 Id. at 177. 
 336 Id. at 178. 
 337 Quickly after Miller came circuit court opinions that basically ignored 
Miller and created their own more stringent tests.  Subsequent cases applied these 
more stringent tests, even while citing Miller, resulting in our current situation where 
most lower federal courts have concluded that the Second Amendment does not 
guarantee an individual right.  See Denning, supra note 138, at 963. 
 338 See DOJ Memorandum, supra note 22; Karen Gullo, Ashcroft Interprets 
2nd Amendment, CBSNews.com (May 23, 2001), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 
2001/05/23/politics/main292854.shtml.  See also David B. Kopel, An Army of One: The 
Right to Bear Arms Belongs to You, Not to the Government, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, May 
29, 2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel052901.shtml (showing that 
Attorneys General from the administrations of Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln 
through Franklin Roosevelt took the individual rights view) (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
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Approaching the 1960s, what older gun collectors call 
the golden age neared its end.  Up to then, war surplus guns 
were plentiful and firearms could be ordered by mail.339  But 
there was trouble ahead.  The thriving culture of gun trading, 
collecting and shooting sports would be rocked by the next 
major federal gun control act. 
The 1960s brought war, cultural revolution and 
assassination.  It was also the decade where the first real 
threat to “the right to keep and bear arms” emerged.  In 1973 
Robert Sherrill wrote: 
There had been gun-control bills eddying around the backwashes of 
Congress for years.  The big emotional tidal wave that set them 
going was President Kennedy’s death; the momentum was 
perpetuated by the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and by the massacre of fourteen people by Charles 
Whitman, shooting from the top of the University of Texas tower.  
Also, from Watts to Newark, rioters did a good job during the 1960s 
of suggesting that maybe everybody should disarm before a few nuts 
triggered a race war.340 
Sherrill makes another observation that is both ironic 
and remarkable.  Tracking the efforts of the domestic gun 
industry to fend off competition from cheap military surplus 
imports, Sherrill shows that American gun manufacturers, 
their agenda promoted by Connecticut Senator Thomas Dodd, 
contributed a central piece to the modern gun control agenda: 
[Importers were bringing in millions of military surplus guns and 
selling them through big mail order houses].  Interarmco was 
importing Colt and Smith & Wesson military revolvers that were 
identical in construction and quality to, and selling for half the price 
  
 339 See, e.g., John T. Amber, This Gun Collecting Game, in GUN DIGEST 
TREASURY 106 (Harold A. Mertz ed., 7th ed. 1994).  In a salient condemnation of the 
mail order trade Robert  Sherrill writes: 
On March 12, 1963, Oswald tore out the coupon and sent along a postal 
money order for $21.45 to Klein’s Sporting Goods Co. in Chicago. . . .  Klein’s 
was just one of many outlets for the Italian surplus military rifles . . . on 
March 13 Klein’s cashed the money order, and seven days later the rifle, fully 
assembled, was on its way by parcel post . . . . 
SHERRILL, supra note 294, at 166. 
 340 Id. at 70.  David Hardy puts the assassinations into legislative context: 
In April 1968, while [the 1968 Act] was in Senate committee consideration, 
Rev. Martin Luther King was murdered by a sniper.  The day before the 
House vote, Robert F. Kennedy was killed.  The day of the House vote, 
President Johnson publicly denounced [this early weaker version of the 1968 
act] as a “half-way measure” . . . . 
Hardy, supra note 191, at 601-02. 
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of, the Colt and Smith & Wesson commercial revolvers peddled in 
the classiest retail stores. 
It’s estimated that between 1959—about the time the New England 
manufacturers really began to get their anti-import propaganda 
going—and 1963,  7 million foreign weapons, mostly military 
surplus, were imported into the United States. 
. . . .  
Around the cheapness of these firearms was to whirl all sorts of 
erroneous claims in the years ahead.  The big American gun 
manufacturers argued that the castoff military weapons were 
unsafe, unreliable, not worth even their cheap price . . . .  Most of the 
military rifles were manufactured to specifications that were higher 
and more rigid than those that apply to most sporting 
firearms. . . .  But the quality of the competing firearms was hardly 
an issue that would be sufficient to inflame Congress.  If the New 
England gun manufacturers wanted to block the imports . . . they 
would have to fall back on something simpler and more easily 
understood by the layman.341 
First they tried a “national security gimmick” claiming 
that imports caused American manufactures to layoff skilled 
labor leaving America vulnerable when the need arose to 
produce combat weapons for the army.342  This argument was 
underwhelming: 
So they needed a new attack.  And that’s when Dodd came up with 
crime in the streets.  Yes, true, to be sure—crime in the streets 
already existed; but it is significant that the gunmakers of New 
England didn’t discover crime until they needed it.  One can search 
the records of Congress and also the records of the bureaucracy from 
the mid-1950s until 1963 and find hardly a suggestion that easy gun 
access might be contributing to urban turmoil and crime. 
. . . .  
. . . [T]he lightbulb went on over Dodd’s head and, lo, before him, 
illuminated in mystic fashion, was the new ploy: Imported Cheap 
Guns Equal Street Crime! 
On this theme was to be launched the 1963 gun-control 
hearings. . . .  The restrictions that Dodd sought to impose on 
firearms would have little effect on the manufactures of America’s 
old-line guns but would, he hoped, cripple the importers of foreign-
made weapons. 
. . . .  
  
 341 SHERRILL, supra note 294, at 87-89. 
 342 Id. at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2005] CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 773 
. . . Just when it seemed that Dodd’s mail-order-guns show was going 
to die for lack of notoriety, president John Kennedy’s death came 
along and revived it. . . .  Whether he wanted to or not, Dodd now 
had to get in there and orate like he meant it, for he was caught by 
the wave of history.343 
The tangible consequence of Dodd’s efforts was the Gun 
Control Act of 1968.344  The Act expanded the definition of 
persons prohibited from purchasing firearms and made 
limitations that were applicable only to interstate sales under 
the 1938 Act, universal.345  The 1968 Act expanded the 
provisions of the 1938 Act, now requiring not just interstate, 
but all dealers to obtain a federal license.346  The Act also 
barred mail order sales entirely, and placed new restrictions on 
dealer and private party sales to out-of-state residents.347 
The era of free transferability was over.  It is in this 
environment that a plausible organized resistance to the right 
to keep and bear arms splashed onto the scene.  In 1975 the 
advocacy gained prominence as Pete Shields, spurred by the 
loss of his son to a criminal with a gun, devoted himself full-
time to the newly formed National Council to Control 
Handguns (renamed Handgun Control, Inc. in 1980).348  Early 
  
 343 Id. at 92-93, 157.  David Hardy also provides interesting insight into the 
character and efforts of Dodd and his work for the establishment domestic gun 
manufacturers. See Hardy, supra note 191, at 595-98.  Hardy characterizes Dodd as a 
staunch conservative (from the state that hosted gun firms Colt, High Standard, 
Remington, Mossberg, Winchester-Western, Strum-Ruger and Marlin) who kept a 
pistol in his desk and tried to take it to Senate floor the day he was to be censured.  Id. 
at 595 nn.56-57. 
 344 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (2004)).  David Hardy details the complicated history leading up to 
the 1968 Act.  Hardy, supra note 191, at 595-604.  It started with a bill introduced by 
Dodd in 1963 that would have restricted mail ordering of handguns.  Id. at 597.  By 
1968 Dodd had lost standing due to a censure vote, but still introduced the Bill that 
essentially became the 1968 act.  Id. 
 345 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-927 (2004); Hardy supra note 191, at 597-98.  See also 
United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1972) (the act also enabled 
regulatory restrictions on importation of small cheap handguns deemed to have 
insufficient utility for sporting purposes). 
 346 Hardy, supra note 191, at 607. 
 347 Id. at 599. 
 348 Brady Campaign, Brady Campaign United with the Million Mom March 
and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, A History of Working to Prevent Gun 
Violence, http://www.bradycampaign.org/press/?page=history (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).  
The Brady organization’s description of the high points of the gun control movement is 
a useful counterpoint to the events I highlight in this section.  It describes personal 
tragedies, discrete pieces of legislation, initiatives of the organization, advertisements 
in the New York Times and, prominently, the recent spate of litigation against the gun 
industry.  But it does not suggest any evidence of grand constitutional moments 
endorsing gun prohibition.  Indeed, some of the organization’s implicit claims seem a 
 
774 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
on, Shields and others made it clear that our gun culture 
required radical change: 
We’re going to have to take one step at a time, and the first step is 
necessarily—given the political realities—going to be very 
modest. . . .  Our ultimate goal—total control of handguns in the 
United States—is going to take time. . . .  The first problem is to slow 
down the increasing number of handguns being produced sold in this 
country.  The second problem is to get handguns registered.  And the 
final problem is to make the possession of all handguns and all 
handgun ammunition—except for the military, police, [security 
guards, licensed clubs and collectors]—totally illegal.349 
Around the same time, the Coalition to Ban Handguns 
was formed.350  As the name promises, its goals were the same 
as HCI’s. 
During this period the NRA was transformed as well.  
Historically it had been occupied with constituent service.351  
The constituents were basically hobbyists.352  NRA’s focus had 
been support for national target matches, hunter education, 
  
bit exaggerated.  See, e.g., Robert B. Bluey, Attendance Down for Anti-Gun Million 
Mom March, CNS NEWS.COM, May 10, 2004, http://www.cnsnews.com/ 
ViewCulture.asp?Page=\Culture\archive\200405\CUL20040510b.html (“It was 
business as usual in the nation’s capital on Sunday despite the presence of the anti-gun 
Million Mom March, which drew only 2,000 people, a fraction of the number expected 
to attend.”); ‘Million Mom March’ Draws 100 for Gun Control, CNN.COM/US, May 13, 
2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/05/13/moms.gun.control/index.html (“In vastly 
reduced numbers from last year’s rally, mothers who support gun control were back at 
the National Mall on Sunday, renewing their calls for tougher laws aimed at curbing 
firearms violence. Only about 100 supporters attended this year . . . .”).  
 349 Richard Harris, A Reporter at Large: Handguns, NEW YORKER, July 26, 
1976, at 57-58.  See also Kates et al., supra note 294, at 515-17 (pointing out scores of 
statements and official positions advocating a total ban on private possession of 
handguns or all firearms). 
 350 Violence Policy Center, Appendix One: Groups and Organizations, Gun 
Control Groups, Coalition to Stop Gun Violence (CSGV) (“[CSGV] is a 501(c)(4) 
lobbying organization founded in 1974 as the National Coalition to Ban Handguns.  
CSGV is a coalition of national religious, professional, educational, and public health 
organizations that endorses banning the sale and private possession of handguns in 
America.”). 
 351 Robert Sherrill’s unflattering description of the NRA affiliation with the 
DCM program describes a group of hobbyists subsidized by the federal government.  
But since the prohibitionist movement had not emerged, the NRA had not developed 
the apparatus to oppose it.  See SHERRILL, supra note 294, at 220-25. 
 352 See Mark Benenson, Op-Ed, Let Me Go Back to the Shooting Range, WASH. 
POST, March 29, 1995, at A25 (“Things have changed for the worse since I joined the 
NRA in 1947, when I was 17 . . . .  We were all gun bugs and target shooters—not much 
different from camera cranks.  The public and the politicians paid very little attention 
to us . . . .  This hobby honeymoon began to fade as the 1950’s wore on. [Then came the 
Kennedy and King assassinations and] . . . the floodgates opened.”). 
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range development and preservation.353  But as gun prohibition 
loomed, the NRA adapted.  By the early 1970s the NRA was 
considered even by critics, 
Dollar for dollar . . . probably the most effective lobby in Washington.  
Its assets hardly put it in the same league with the oil lobby, and for 
a crash campaign it could not gather the kind of slush fund the 
American Medical Association raised to fight Medicare.  But among 
grass-roots lobbying organizations who specialize in letter writing 
campaigns, the National Rifle Association is in a class by itself.  Its 
officials have boasted that they can get their million members to hit 
Congress with at least half a million letters on seventy-two-hour 
notice. . . .  [A]t the height of the Vietnam War, Senator Edward 
Kennedy of Massachusetts said he was regularly getting more mail 
on the pending gun-control legislation than on the war . . . .354 
In 1975, NRA established the Institute for Legislative 
Action (“ILA”) in response to growing prohibitionist advocacy.355  
Today, when people lament or boast of the NRA’s lobbying 
power they are really talking about ILA.  It is largely through 
ILA, its capacity to rally the tens of millions of NRA 
sympathetic gun owners to vote for gun rights candidates and 
pester those who are not, that NRA’s gun rights agenda has 
advanced.356 
One manifestation of this was the 1986 Firearms 
Owner’s Protection Act (FOPA).357  In the years immediately 
after the 1968 Act, participants in the old gun show culture—
collectors without dealer’s licenses who still went to shows and 
bought and sold guns—were prosecuted for dealing firearms 
without a license.358  Prompted in part by complaints that these 
  
 353 The National Rifle Association Headquarters, http://www.nrahq.org (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 354 SHERRILL, supra note 294, at 195. 
 355 NRA’s Legislative Affairs Division had been around since 1934.  It did not 
lobby, but did mailings about legislative issues to members.  See Brief History of NRA, 
supra note 161. 
 356 See discussion accompanying infra note 421. 
 357 Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-
926A, 929, & 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (2000)). 
 358 See Hardy, supra note 191, at 628-30.  One response to this was quite a 
number of people obtaining easily available federal firearms licenses.  With this license 
the old gun trading culture was revived somewhat.  So much so that by 1994 the 
Clinton administration lamented the nearly 250,000 licensed gun dealers. Worried that 
these kitchen table dealers were a source of guns used in crime, the Clinton 
administration developed more stringent regulatory requirements that reduced the 
number of federal firearms licenses to about 58,000.  See Press Release, Violence Policy 
Center, Eleventh-Hour NRA Amendment to Justice Department Appropriations Bill 
Would License Tens of Thousands of New “Kitchen-Table” Gun Dealers (July 21, 2003), 
http://www.vpc.org/press/0307ffl.htm. 
776 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
prosecutions targeted harmless collectors with felony 
prosecution, FOPA was alternately described as “necessary to 
restore fundamental fairness and clarity to our Nation’s 
firearms laws,” and “a national disgrace.”359 
FOPA made substantial changes to the Gun Control Act 
of 1968.  Among the most notable, it diminished the chance 
that a gun collector would be prosecuted for dealing firearms 
without a license,360 liberalized slightly the restrictions on 
dealer sales of long guns to nonresidents,361 gave gun owners 
the right to transport a legally possessed firearm through any 
state, notwithstanding contrary state law (so long as the gun is 
unloaded and not readily accessible)362 and strengthened the 
position of gun dealers against government enforcement 
actions in a variety of minor ways.363  It was a decided 
diminution of the regulatory apparatus affecting lawful 
possession and transfer of firearms,364 and represented a 
substantial win for the gun crowd. 
  
 359 See Hardy, supra note 191, at 585, 629-30 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. H2665 
(daily ed. Apr. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Tallon)); 132 CONG. REC. H1751 (daily ed. 
Apr. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep. Weiss). 
 360 Hardy, supra note 191, at 629, 630 & n.244.  Under the 1968 Act, some gun 
collectors were prosecuted for dealing in firearms without a license (collector who sold 
three guns over a two-year period prosecuted for dealing guns without a license).  Id. at 
606 n.118.  FOPA gave additional protections to hobbyists by defining more tightly 
what it means to engage in the business of firearms sales.  Id. at 630.  Before FOPA, 
the prudent thing for collectors to do was obtain a dealer license.  These were relatively 
easy to get.  Under the Clinton administration, it was deemed a risk to public safety to 
have so many licensed gun dealers, many of whom were the same class of hobbyists 
who faced prosecution under the 1968 Act for not having a dealer license.  See supra 
note 358. 
 361 Hardy, supra note 191, at 634. 
 362 Id. at 677-78.  A legally possessed gun is one the person is allowed to 
possess in the place he is traveling from and the place he is traveling to.  Prohibitive 
state regulations he encounters en route are trumped by the FOPA.  Id. 
 363 See id. at 643-53. 
 364 David Hardy concludes: 
FOPA’s amendment of the Gun Control Act is both deep and wide 
ranging. . . .  FOPA will require greatly increased sensitivity, efficiency and 
coordination on the part of the administering agency.  Delays may run afoul 
of FOPA’s various limitation periods; unjustified administrative inspections 
may clash with its restrictions on searches . . . .  FOPA confers both 
substantive and procedural rights upon citizens accused of Gun Control Act 
violations.  Scienter requirements limit application of most of the Act’s 
sanctions to willful violators; a citizen who wins a criminal acquittal need not 
face civil sanctions based on the same allegation . . . and the unprecedented 
availability of attorneys’ fees awards ensures that the financial risks of a 
meritorious defense may well be shifted to the prosecuting agency. 
Id. at 680-81. 
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But the prohibitionist movement was having success as 
well.  And at points the threat to private ownership of firearms 
seemed quite real.  Gun bans and stringent restrictions 
emerged in discrete spots.  Washington, D.C. enacted a 
handgun ban in 1976 and mandated that long guns be kept 
disassembled.365  In 1981, the Illinois city of Morton Grove 
enacted a handgun ban whose validity was upheld by the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and, in 1983, the Supreme 
Court declined to hear the case.366  In 1982, San Francisco and 
Berkeley, California enacted similar ordinances but these were 
invalidated on state statutory grounds the same year.367  
Around the same time, the city of Chicago368 and several of its 
suburbs enacted severe handgun restrictions that remain in 
place today.369 
Between the late seventies and early eighties, we 
reached the crest of the prohibitionist movement.370  Buoyed by 
  
 365 D.C. CODE §§ 7-2502.02(4), 7-2507.02.  See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, 
Second-Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the District of Columbia, 5 
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 105, 105 (1994). 
 366 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981), 
aff’d, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).  See generally Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun 
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 
250, 251 & n.198 (1983). 
 367 Kates, Jr., supra note 366, at 251 n.198 (citing Doe v. City and County of 
San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 368 Section 8-20-010 of the Municipal Code of Chicago enacted a freeze on 
handgun ownership in 1982. 
 369 Oak Park banned handgun sales in 1977 and ownership in 1984. OAK PARK 
VILLAGE, ILL.,  CODE §§ 27-1-1, 27-1-2, 27-2-1 (1994), available at 
http://www.sterlingcodifiers.com/IL/Oak%20Park/index.htm; NRA-ILA, Fact Sheets, 
The War Against Handguns (Feb. 15, 2001), http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets 
/Read.aspx?ID=17.  Evanston implemented a ban in 1982. EVANSTON, ILL., CODE § 9-8-
2 (2005), available at http://www.sterlingcodifiers.com/IL/Evanston /index.htm; NRA-
ILA, supra.  In 1989, Wilmette became the fifth municipality nationwide to ban 
handguns.  WILMETTE ILL., CODE § 12-24(b) (2005), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/wilmette_il/villageofwilmetteillinoisco
deofordinance?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:wilmette_il; Lisa Black, 
Wilmette Stands by Handgun Ban; Law Scrutinized After Intruder Shot, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 14, 2004, Metro NW, at 1.  Unlike many states, Illinois does not preempt 
municipal regulation of firearms.  430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/13.1 (2005).  See also City of 
Chicago v. Taylor, 774 N.E.2d 22, 28 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
 370 Let me reemphasize the distinction I have made throughout.  There is 
quite a lot going on in the gun debate.  And it is not accurate to say that Americans 
have rejected gun control as distinguished from gun prohibition.  Throughout this 
discussion I have said that the important contest here is between the “prohibitionist” 
agenda and a constitutional right to arms that would block it.  My intent is to 
distinguish more between policies than people.  There are baskets full of gun control 
measures at the state, local, and federal levels.  The dispute here is not really about 
these various regulatory schemes.  Rather it is between constitutional protection of an 
armed society and a structure where individual firearms survive purely at the will of 
the legislature. 
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municipal ordinances banning handguns, but frustrated that 
statewide legislation seemed to have been thwarted (by the gun 
lobby or otherwise), prohibitionists bypassed the legislature 
and went straight to the people.  The result was failed gun ban 
referenda in Massachusetts and California that are richly 
described by David Bordua. 
In what was originally billed as a major step in the eventual national 
banning of private ownership of handguns, a ban proposition was 
placed before the people of Massachusetts at the time of the national 
election in November 1976.  Advocates were highly optimistic.  
Massachusetts was the “most liberal” state in the union.  Gun 
ownership rates were relatively low.  Boston’s major newspaper, the 
Globe, favored the ban, as did the Christian Science Monitor, the 
Washington Post and the New York Times. 
The pro-ban movement was led by a group called People vs. 
Handguns, which had been established in early 1974 under the 
primary leadership of John J. Buckley, Sheriff of Middlesex 
County. . . .  
. . . .  
Gun control advocates in Massachusetts saw this as a golden 
opportunity to bypass the gun lobby and go directly to the people—
the people whose will had so long been thwarted by the National 
Rifle Association.  The closeness of the predicted result indicated 
that every effort should be made to “get out the vote.”  As cited in 
Holmberg and Clancy (1977: 35), 
Speaking for People vs. Handguns, Buckley said, “For many 
years the legislature has listened to the small but loud voice 
of the gun lobby” and he urged the legislature to “listen to 
the voice of the people.” 
The outcome was defeat of the proposition by a vote of 1,669,945 to 
743,014—a ration [sic] of 2.25 to 1.  Put another way, the proposition 
to ban private ownership of handguns was opposed by 69.2% of the 
2,412,959 votes cast on the proposition (Holmberg and Clancy, 1977: 
156).  Eighty-six percent of the eligible electorate went to the polls.  
A full 77% of the eligible Massachusetts voters voted on the handgun 
proposition. 
. . . .  
The central element of [California] Proposition 15 was the 
requirement that all handguns be registered between November 3, 
1982, and November 3, 1983, after which time registration would be 
frozen.  The attempt was to freeze the number of handguns by 
freezing registrations. 
. . . The size and greater difficulty of campaigning in such a large 
and diverse state and the feeling that events such as the attempted 
assassination of President Reagan and especially the murder of John 
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Lennon [led to predictions the proposition might come close to 
passing] . . . .  
It is far too early to present a thorough analysis of the campaign and 
countercampaign over Proposition 15.  The results, however, were 
quite like those in Massachusetts.  Voter turnout was high—72% of 
eligible voters.  The proposition was defeated by 63% to 37%—not as 
dramatic as the 69% to 31% defeat in Massachusetts, but decisive 
nonetheless. 
. . . .  
Sheriff Buckley was wrong.  When severe gun control is made salient 
and the public is approached directly, the gun lobby turns out to be 
more in tune with public opinion than do the civic disarmers.  This 
conclusion is based on a national NRA-sponsored poll by a 
“conservative” firm; by a slightly populist sociologist’s survey in 
Illinois in 1977; and, with less analysis, by a gun-control-movement-
sponsored poll conducted in Massachusetts in 1977 by a “liberal” 
firm. 
The conclusions from survey data are confirmed by the 
overwhelming defeat of two strict gun control proposals: the 
Massachusetts handgun ban in 1976 and Proposition 15 in 
California in 1982.  These gun lobby victories cannot be explained by 
richer campaign budgets, nor by superior lobbying frequency and 
skill, since both gun control defeats were by the electorate as a 
whole . . . .371 
In 1993, as a gun ban referendum was failing in 
Madison, Wisconsin,372 President Bill Clinton was asked 
whether he supported a ban on handguns.  In an answer that 
has been construed as meaning Yes, eventually, he said, “I don’t 
think the American people are there right now.  But with more 
than 200 million guns in circulation, we’ve got so much more to 
do on this issue before we even reach that.”373  And earlier, this: 
“We can’t be so fixated on our desire to preserve the rights of 
ordinary Americans to legitimately own handguns and 
rifles . . . that we are unable to think about [] reality.”374 
  
 371 David J. Bordua, Adversary Polling and the Construction of Social 
Meaning: Implications in Gun Control Elections in Massachusetts and California, 5 
LAW & POL’Y Q. 345, 355-56, 359-60, 364 (1983), available at 
www.saf.org/LawReviews/BorduaQuarterly.htm. 
 372 See McFadden, supra note 44, at 714. 
 373 Jann S. Wenner & William Greider, The Rolling Stone Interview: President 
Clinton, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 9, 1993, at 45. 
 374 Paul Bedard, Clinton a Boon to NRA; Fund Raising Ad Cites His Stands, 
WASH. TIMES, July 6, 1993, at A1; Press Release, U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm. 
(Sept. 21, 1999), available at http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/92199ClintonGunLaws.pdf. 
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Clinton was elected to two terms and by 2004 opined 
that his administration’s gun policies, particularly the now 
expired 1994 gun ban, cost Democrats control of Congress and 
that Al Gore’s carryover support for more stringent gun control 
contributed to Gore’s loss in 2000.375 
And that part of the story deserves further attention.  
By the mid to late 1990s, with two statewide handgun ban 
referenda defeated, the public conversation was less about 
outright bans, and more about gun control as crime control.  
Proposals for waiting periods and background checks evolved 
into the instant check system in place today.376 
Still, during this period there were serious proposals to 
restrict firearms possession by ordinary citizens.  The 
ambitions of groups like the Coalition to Ban Handguns were 
being pressed, but gained little traction.  The problem was, the 
same types of guns (handguns) preferred by criminals were 
also the tools preferred by good people interested in self-
defense.  The full details of the debate are a story yet to be told, 
but by the 1990s Americans seemed to have rejected handgun 
bans. 
Undaunted, Josh Sugarman in a now famous 
memorandum summarized the problem and suggested an 
entirely new target for prohibition.  Dave Kopel reports, “Josh 
Sugarman authored the November 1988 strategy memo 
suggesting that the press and the public had lost interest in 
handgun control.  He counseled the anti-gun lobby to switch to 
the ‘assault weapon’ issue, which the lobby did with 
spectacular success in 1989.”377  In Sugarman’s words: 
Although handguns claim more than 20,000 lives a year, the issue of 
handgun restrictions consistently remains a non-issue with the vast 
majority of legislators, the press, and public. . . .  Assault 
weapons . . . are a new topic.  The weapons’ menacing looks, coupled 
with the public’s confusion over fully automatic machine guns versus 
semi-automatic assault weapons—anything that looks like a 
machine gun is assumed to be a machine gun—can only increase the 
chance of public support for restrictions on these weapons.378 
  
 375 See text at infra note 390 and accompanying text. 
 376 For information about the National Instant Criminal Background Check 
System (NICS), see NICS Information, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/nics/index.htm (last 
visited Feb 8, 2006). 
 377 David B. Kopel, Assault Weapons, in GUNS: WHO SHOULD HAVE THEM? 
159, 190-92 (1995). 
 378 VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., ASSAULT WEAPONS AND ACCESSORIES IN AMERICA 
(1988), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/awacont.htm. 
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While it was true that these obscure guns were seldom 
used in crime, the rare instances where they were, turned out 
to be striking illustrations of the costs of an armed society.379  
After a full court press by Clinton and his allies in Congress380 
the assault weapons ban passed.381 
It turns out that the ban really wasn’t much of a ban 
after all.  The legislation focused not on functionality but on 
accouterments that had no lethal function.  Except for a few of 
the rarest examples, most of the “banned” guns remained on 
the market after simple modifications to remove the bayonet 
  
 379 See Jon E. Dougherty, California Expanding Ban on “Assault Weapons,” 
WORLDNETDAILY.COM, Dec. 31, 2000, http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp? 
ARTICLE_ID=15421 (discussing Patrick Purdy’s attack on a school playground in 
Stockton, California). 
 380 David Kopel writes: 
The federal “assault weapon” ban could not have become law without the 
substantial, energetic assistance of President Clinton.  In April and May of 
1994, the president ordered the executive branch into a full-court press to 
pass the “assault weapon” prohibition in the House of Representatives.  The 
ban lost by a single vote, but House Speaker Tom Foley violated the rules of 
the House, and delayed declaring the vote ended until House leaders could 
cajole after-the-fact vote switches, thereby giving the ban a 216-to-214 
victory.  The “assault weapon” ban was incorporated into a comprehensive 
federal crime bill several weeks later. 
When the crime bill came to the floor of the House . . . in August 1994, 
[opponents] appeared to have killed the bill on a procedural vote.  Senate 
Majority Leader George Mitchell and House Speaker Foley went to the White 
House, and told President Clinton that the crime bill could not pass if the 
“assault weapon” ban was included.  Moreover, they warned that voting for a 
crime bill containing an “assault weapon” ban would hurt Democrats all over 
the country. 
President Clinton’s pollster Stanley Greenberg disagreed.  He produced data 
which he said showed that not a single Democrat would lose his seat over the 
“assault weapon” ban. White House strategists suggested that because the 
“assault weapon” issue had such high public visibility, the president would 
appear indecisive if he did not insist on retaining the gun ban.  The president 
did insist, and, after weeks of hard-fought insider politicking, the House and 
the Senate both passed the crime bill with the full-strength version of the 
“assault weapon” ban. 
A few weeks after the November 1994 elections, President Clinton telephoned 
one of the leading Democratic supporters of the . . . ban.  After congratulating 
the Congressman on his reelection, the president opined that the . . . ban had 
cost the Democrats twenty-one seats in the House of Representatives.  
Clinton later told the Cleveland Plain-Dealer that the “assault weapon” issue 
and the NRA’s efforts had given the Republicans twenty additional seats. 
KOPEL, supra note 301, at 160.  
 381 Congress amended the 1968 Gun Control Act with the Crime Control Act of 
1994, adding restrictions on the sale of certain magazine fed, center fire, 
semiautomatic rifles.  18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922.  A summary of the 1994 Act appears in 
NRA v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 277-79 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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lug and flash-hider and swap out the pistol grip and folding 
stocks.382 
And something else happened.  The ban, that was not a 
ban, gave these formerly obscure guns a higher profile.  People 
who were never interested in them now wanted one . . . or 
two.383  After nearly ten years of being banned, these guns were 
more plentiful and cheaper than before the ban.384  Even most 
of the magazines (the ammunition feeding device), which truly 
were prohibited from further manufacture, were, judging by 
pricing, more plentiful than before the ban.385 
Some people believed that Congress had quite properly 
banned machine guns.386  Those who were paying attention 
  
 382 Gun control groups characterized these adjustments differently. “Despite 
the [assault weapons] ban, many gun manufacturers have evaded the law by making 
minor modifications to banned weapons.”  Join Together Online, Hot Issues: Federal 
Assault Weapons Ban, http://web.archive.org/web/20031013174812/ 
www.jointogether.org/gv/issues/hot_issues/assaultweapon/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 383 See David B. Kopel, Editorial, More Guns, Less Gun Violence, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 4, 2000, at A10, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/ 
a398a9e4c7569.htm (“Bill Clinton has been the best president the gun industry ever 
had.  During the antigun panics that Mr. Clinton helped incite in 1993-94, and again in 
1999, firearms sales skyrocketed, as consumers bought while they still could. For some 
months in 1993-94, manufacturers were running their plants on three shifts a day and 
still couldn’t keep up with demand.”). 
 384 Issues of The Shotgun News throughout the ten years of the ban show 
functionally identical guns available after the ban for lower prices than before it.  
(Collection of THE SHOTGUN NEWS on file with author.) 
 385 For example, tens of millions of magazines for the AR-15 type 
(semiautomatic version of the U.S.G.I. rifle) rifle were in circulation world wide.  One 
evident exception was magazines for Glock pistols. These guns are of fairly recent 
design and thus relatively few of the magazines were in circulation. After the ban went 
into effect, Glock magazine prices escalated to over 150 dollars.  After the ban expired 
they are back to the seventy-five dollar level.  Deborah Sontag, Many Say End of 
Firearm Ban Changed Little, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, at 1, available at 
http://www.galleryofguns.com/shootingtimes/Articles/DisplayArticles.asp?ID=7044. 
  During the ban, there was such a premium on pre-ban Glock magazines 
that dealers would trade police departments a new (law enforcement only) pistol for the 
departments’ used pre-ban pistols.  With three pre-ban magazines selling for over 100 
dollars, the old Glock (with its pre-ban magazines) was worth as much on the open 
market as a new one.  (Interview notes of authors’ conversations with dealers on file 
with author.) 
  For commentary and criticism of lawsuits against the gun industry by the 
same municipalities that have been selling used police guns back onto the market in 
exchange for discounts on new ones see the sources cited infra note 418. 
 386 Over the past three years between seventy and ninety percent of the 
second and third year law students in my Gun Control seminar have believed that the 
Assault Weapons Ban was a ban on fully automatic machine guns.  Conversations 
suggest that sloppy news reporting contributes to this perception.  Whatever the cause, 
Josh Sugarman guessed right.  It seems many people thought the legislation was about 
machine guns.  See, e.g., Editorial, Republicans Hurt Themselves with Pro-gun Votes, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Mar. 28, 1996, at 15A. 
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appreciated that the law was mainly symbolic.387  But the ban 
had potentially long term practical value.  Congress had 
embraced the “bad gun formula” of gun prohibition.  With that 
done, prohibition might advance by expanding the category.  
(Hunting rifles might become “sniper rifles,” thirty pound 
single shot .50 caliber rifles might become “terrorist weapons,” 
etc.). 
Bill Clinton expended considerable political capital to 
pass the assault weapons ban.  The political fallout was 
dramatic.  In the next election Democrats lost the House and 
have yet to regain it.  Clinton attributed Democrats’ loss of the 
House significantly to the wrath of gun owners.388  Even House 
Speaker Tom Foley (D-Wash.) was unseated.  Descriptions of 
the fallout by Clinton and other Democrats are stories of a 
failure.389 
According to Clinton, the fallout continued into the 2000 
presidential race.  Presidential elections are complicated 
stories.  But in a 2004 interview with Charlie Rose, Clinton 
said this about the defeat of Albert Gore in 2000: 
The NRA beat him in Arkansas.  The NRA and Ralph Nader stand 
right behind the Supreme Court in their ability to claim that they 
  
 387 As the ban seemed ready to expire, Tom Diaz of the Violence Policy Center 
acknowledged in an interview on National Public Radio: 
If the existing assault weapons ban expires, I personally do not believe it will 
make one whit of difference one way or another in terms of our objective, 
which is reducing death and injury and getting a particularly lethal class of 
firearms off the streets.  So if it doesn’t pass, it doesn’t pass. 
[In the interview Diaz displays a gun that remained legal under the ban, and 
NPR Reporter Larry Abramson explains that “the manufacturer, simply 
redesigned the gun to remove features specifically forbidden by the assault 
weapons ban, like a collapsible stock.”] 
The bells and whistles that were [prohibited by] the earlier law, this gun has 
none of them, so it’s perfectly legal.  This stock kind of looks like it folds, but 
it doesn’t.  It’s fixed.  There’s no bayonet mount on this gun. 
Assault Weapons Ban Due to Expire in September (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 11, 2004), 
available at http://cgi.cse.unsw.edu.au/~lambert/cgi-bin/johnrlott.tripod.com/other 
/NPRSemiAutoBan.html. 
 388 Evelyn Theiss, Clinton Blames Losses on NRA, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 14, 
1995, at A1. 
 389 Theiss, supra note 388 (“[T]he fight for the assault-weapons ban cost 20 
members their seats in Congress . . . .  The NRA is the reason the Republicans control 
the house.”); Departing California Congressman Anthony Beilenson said this: “We 
unnecessarily lost good Democratic members because of their votes on the Brady bill 
and semiautomatic assault weapon ban. . . .  [T]hey will have but a modest effect out 
there in the real world.  It was not worth it at all.”  Greg Pierce, Inside Politics, WASH. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at A6. 
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put George Bush in the White House. . . .  I think the NRA had 
enough votes in New Hampshire, in Arkansas, maybe in Tennessee 
and in Missouri to beat us.  And they nearly whipped us in two or 
three other places.390 
After the Gore loss, the Democrats seemed less excited 
about the prohibitionist agenda, evidently concerned that the 
anti-gun stance had cost them.  Writing for the New York 
Times in 2001, James Dao (after blaming the evident decline of 
the gun control movement on George W. Bush) says this: 
[M]any centrist and conservative Democrats have also concluded 
that gun control has become their party’s albatross, costing it crucial 
votes among white, male, rural voters in key states across the South 
and Midwest.  And their concerns have touched off a roiling debate 
within the party over whether to play down or even discard the 
issue. 
“Gun control,” lamented Steve Cobble, director of Campaign for a 
Progressive Future, a liberal political action committee, “has become 
the shorthand for why Democrats don’t do well.” 
Even President Clinton, a staunch advocate of gun control, offered 
what for gun control advocates was surely a dispiriting post-election 
assessment of the rifle association’s strength.  “They probably had 
more to do than anyone else in the fact we didn’t win the House this 
time, and they hurt Al Gore,” he said.391 
Leading up to the 2004 presidential election, the 
Democratic National Committee commissioned a study of how 
the party’s stance on guns has affected the election of 
Democrats.392  The study’s overall aim is to at least repackage 
  
 390 George F. Will, Bringing Out the Big Guns, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2004, at 
A31. 
 391 James Dao, New Gun Control Politics: A Whimper, Not a Bang, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, § 4, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers 
/featured_articles/20010312monday.html. 
  Pressed on how hard Democrats should push for renewal of the assault 
weapon ban, Governor Mark Warner (D-VA) said: 
I don’t think shifting the rate [sic] back onto a gun control issue is going to at 
least in southern states and many Midwestern states is going to move the 
Democrats forward.  Bill Clinton told the congressmen in ‘94 they’d be real 
popular if they did that.  Ninety million gun owners deep le [sic] resented it 
and many, many congressmen were voted out of office.  
Live From the Headlines: Assault Weapon Ban Up for Renewal Soon (CNN Television 
Broadcast, May 15, 2003), available at http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/15/ 
se.13.html. 
 392 Mark J. Penn & Peter Brodnitz, Winning the Gun Vote (Oct. 16, 2003), 
http://www.dlc.org/documents/AGS_Penn_1003.pdf. 
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the message to make it more palatable to gun owners.393  This 
is understandable since the first two sentences of the study 
conclude: “Americans widely believe that there is a right to 
bear arms but many—gun owners in particular—do not believe 
Democrats share this belief.  As gun owners represent almost 
four in ten Americans this perception impedes efforts to create 
a durable Democratic majority.”394 
Depending on who tells the story, this sentiment is 
roughly confirmed by another failed referendum.  This one in 
Washington state.  Initiative 676 was presented as a gun safety 
measure and focused on the powerful image of children killed 
in firearms accidents.395  Although in a typical year, these 
events are relatively rare—twice as many children ages five to 
fourteen die in bicycle accidents than in gun accidents396—the 
image of a child dying because of a negligently stored gun is 
incredibly powerful and was the motivating theme of 
Washington Initiative 676.397 
Initiative 676 would have moved Washington toward 
the New York, Sullivan Law style of regulating handguns 
(recall our earlier discussion of Sullivan Law handgun 
regulations, requiring a permit for possession, spurring 
adoption of the Uniform Revolver Act that required a permit 
for concealed carry but not for mere possession).398  Possession 
of a handgun would require a license.399  It would be called a 
  
 393 Id. 
 394 Id.  The survey found that seventy-four percent of Americans “believe there 
is a Constitutional right to own guns but it allows for laws intended to keep guns out of 
the hands of criminals.”  Id. 
 395 See Office of the Secretary of Washington State,  Voter’s Pamphlet: State 
General Election Nov. 4, 1997, at 6-7 (1st ed. 1997), available at 
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/pdf /vp97gen.pdf. 
 396 See David B. Kopel, Children and Guns: Sensible Solutions, 
INDEPENDENCE INST., Apr. 25, 1993, http://www.rkba.org/research/kopel/kids-gun.html. 
 397 A report by The News Hour is illustrative: 
Washington State has introduced tough legislation in an attempt to reduce 
gun-related accidents.  But will the legislation, called Initiative 676, really 
protect the innocent or does it infringe on the right to bear arms?  Rod 
Minott . . . files this report. 
Rod Minott: Two years ago a shooting accident took the life of 14-year-old 
Michael Hastings.  It happened after a babysitter at a friend’s home played 
with a stolen handgun. 
Transcript of Newshour: A Shot at Safety (PBS television broadcast Nov. 4, 1997), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec97/guns_11-4.html. 
 398 See supra text accompanying notes 191-92. 
 399 Initiative 676, § 4 (Wash. 1997), available at http:// www.secstate.wa.gov/ 
elections/initiatives/text/i676.pdf. 
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“handgun safety license.”400  Applicants for the license would 
have course work (eight hours minimum) and an examination 
to complete.401  676 required all handguns to be sold with 
trigger locks, but had no other requirements for safe storage or 
penalties for unsafe storage.402  The teeth of 676 was the 
requirement of a license to own the gun. 
When the votes were counted nearly seventy percent of 
voters said no to Initiative 676.403  Sarah Brady of Handgun 
Control, Inc. criticized that the result was warped by NRA 
money.404  Gun rights advocates charged that the initiative’s 
financial supporters numbered only 1,000 people from the 
Seattle area including Bill Gates (in for about $200,000).405  An 
in-depth study of the failure of 676 is yet to come.  Undoubtedly 
there was lobbying on both sides.  Sarah Brady suggested that 
NRA obfuscation is the only way to explain why 
Washingtonians would vote against a measure designed to 
reduce the tragedy of juvenile gun accidents.406  But it is just 
possible that voters were not convinced on the basic message. 
The National Safety Council reported in 2002 that since 
1993, firearm homicides are down 41 percent, and fatal firearm 
accidents have dropped 49 percent to the lowest levels since 
  
 400 Id. 
 401 Id. at § 10. 
 402 Id. at § 3. 
 403 The final tally was 1,193,720 against and 496,633 for.  SeattleTimes.com, 
1997 Election Results, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/politics/past_results/1997 
/state_97.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 404  
The NRA came into the state using their multi-million-dollar bulldozer to 
squash this grassroots call for responsible gun ownership. Unable to defeat 
this reasonable and responsible Initiative with facts, the NRA blanketed the 
airwaves with apocalyptic rhetoric—which even included accusations that I 
676 supporters had Satanic connections. 
Press Release, Handgun Control, Statement by Sarah Brady Re: NRA’s Big Guns Hold 
Washington State Hostage to Weak Gun Laws (Nov. 4, 1997), available at 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/press/release.php?release=94. 
 405  
Billed as a “grassroots movement,” I-676 proponents had a contributor list of 
about 1000 individuals.  90+% of their money came from within a 20 mile 
radius of Seattle.  WeCARE. . . . the PAC formed to oppose the initiative, had 
a contributor list of more  than 11,000.  Who had the grassroots movement?  
Joe Waldron, The Final Count on I-676 in Washington State, 
http://www.womenshooters.com/wfn/i676.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 406 See supra note 404. 
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record-keeping started in 1903.407  To add some context, in 2002 
there were 44,000 accidental automobile deaths, 15,700 
accidental poisoning deaths, 14,500 accidental deaths caused 
by falls, 3,000 accidental drowning deaths, 2,900 accidental 
deaths caused by fires, flames, and smoke,  1,000 accidental 
deaths caused by natural heat or cold and 776 accidental 
firearms deaths.408  In this context it is a bit easier to 
understand how voters might reject even an honestly packaged 
gun safety measure.409   
It is hard to find a facially objective source on the sense 
of Washington voters about Initiative 676410 but the University 
of Washington student newspaper may come close: 
Initiative 676 is a cleverly crafted attempt to trick voters into giving 
gun-control proponents a real treat by turning a constitutionally 
protected right into a state regulated privilege. 
. . . . 
Depending on who you listen to, I-676 is about trigger locks, 
handgun safety courses, police confiscation, inflated bureaucracy, 
handgun databases and the influence of Satan. 
. . . . 
One section of Initiative 676 requires all handguns to be equipped 
with trigger locks when sold. . . .  [It] doesn’t stop with trigger locks.  
It requires all handgun owners to take an eight-hour safety courses 
and obtain a gun license. 
. . . .  
. . . The right-wing paranoids hint that the proposed database of 
handgun owners, one of I-676’s 26 provisions, is part of the black-
helicopter conspiracy to disarm America.  And there’s NRA Vice 
  
 407 THE NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS (2003), available at 
www.nsc.org/library/report_injury_usa.htm. 
 408 Id. 
 409 This year in my gun control seminar, I asked students to survey three of 
their classmates.  The two questions were, “How many guns are owned by Americans” 
and “How many gun accidents are there each year?”  One law student, who admitted 
she did not know the answer, speculated from what she had seen and read in the media 
that there were about 500,000 guns owned by Americans and that there were around 
100,000 accidental firearms deaths each year. 
 410 L. Brent Bozell III of the Media Research Center charged that 676 was 
consistently front page news in the run up to the vote, when there was some sense it 
would pass.  The coverage was drastically muted after 676 was defeated: “Maybe we 
shouldn’t blame the national media for downplaying the [gun rights] victory.  After all, 
after spending years labeling a group as ‘extreme,’ ‘radical’ and the like—how to 
explain its 71% landslide?”  L. Brent Bozell, III & Tim Graham, Editorial, An NRA 
Victory? That’s Not Fit to Print, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1997, at A22. 
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President Charlton Heston, who thinks the measure should be 
designated “I-666.” 
Demonic influence aside, it’s too bad poor arguments have clouded 
the I-676 debate.  It’s a confusing bill that will create a gross 
expansion of state intrusion into private lives, and the voters of 
Washington state deserve to know the truth.411 
Having only sporadic success in the legislatures, gun 
prohibitionists pursue a parallel strategy in the courts and 
regulatory agencies, with lawsuits aimed at manufacturers and 
distributors.  The recipe included proposals to regulate 
firearms as defective consumer products and to sanction 
manufacturers for deceptive advertising.412  These initiatives 
have had some limited success, forcing some companies and 
brands to go out of business.413  Handgun manufacturer Smith 
& Wesson, attempting to ward off these lawsuits, entered into 
a settlement with the Clinton Administration.414  An immediate 
consequence was gun people boycotting Smith.415  Other 
manufactures declined to follow Smith’s lead.416  Some state 
  
 411 Editorial, Of Guns . . . Initiative 676 is Confusing and Unnecessary, 
ONLINE DAILY UNIV. OF WASH., Oct. 29, 1997, http://archives.thedaily.washington.edu 
/1997/102997/guns.102997.html. 
 412 For discussions of these strategies and the issues they raise, see Jon S. 
Vernick & Julie Samia Mair, State Laws Forbidding Municipalities from Suing the 
Firearm Industry: Will Firearm Immunity Laws Close the Courthouse Door?, 4 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 126 (2000) (putting the number of state laws explicitly 
banning municipal lawsuits at 19); Anne Giddings Kimball & Sarah L. Olson, 
Municipal Firearm Litigation: Ill Conceived From Any Angle, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1277 
(2000); James H. Warner, Municipal Anti-Gun Lawsuits: How Questionable Litigation 
Substitutes for Legislation, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 775, 776 (2000); Jon S. Vernick 
and Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as Consumer 
Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1193 (2000); David B. Kopel, Treating Guns Like 
Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1213 (2000) (responding to Vernick and Teret); 
Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability is Dead, 
Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777 (1995) (advancing a theory of 
negligent marketing and distribution); Debra Burke, JoAnne Hopper & B.J. Dunlap, 
Women, Guns, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 219 (1997); 
Alana Bassin, Why Packing a Pistol Perpetuates Patriarchy, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
351 (1997); Annie Tai Kao, Note, A More Powerful Plaintiff: State Public Nuisance 
Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 212 (2002). 
 413 See, e.g., Sharon Walsh, The Cheapest Handgun Was Loaded with Profit; 
For Pistol Firm, Heavy Sales, Then Bankruptcy Protection, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1999, 
at A1. 
 414 See, e.g., Amy Paulson, Smith & Wesson Agrees to Landmark Gun Safety 
Settlement, CNN.com, Mar. 17, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS 
/stories/03/17/gun.lawsuit/index.html; Smith & Wesson Agrees to ‘Code of Conduct,’ 
Federal, Local Officials Agree to Drop Suits, COURTTV ONLINE, Mar. 17, 2000, 
http://www.courttv.com/archive/national/2000/0317/clinton_guns_ap.html. 
 415 See MCCLURG ET. AL, supra note 214, at 347-55. 
 416 S & W Under the Gun, GOTTLIEB-TARTARO REPORT, Apr. 2000, at 1, 
available at http://www.ccrkba.org/pub/rkba/gt-report/gt-report_064.html. 
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legislatures enacted statutes blocking their municipalities from 
bringing these suits.417 
With the passing of the Clinton administration, the 
Smith & Wesson initiative lost steam.  Smith & Wesson’s 
British management team sauntered off.  New owners stepped 
in and Smith & Wesson chased after its lost goodwill with gun 
owners.  The lawsuits continued, some of them tinged with 
irony because many of the municipalities that have sued gun 
companies on the negligent marketing theory of dumping guns 
also sell large lots of their old police guns back into the market 
at bargain basement prices.418 
In search of constitutional moments we are after 
something approximating democratic assent.  Is it a concession 
of defeat at the ballot box that one of the prohibitionists’ 
central strategies at this stage of the game is to bypass 
democracy and pursue litigation?  As the wave of creative 
lawsuits against gun manufacturers was building, The 
Economist criticized: 
American public officials have usurped democratic debate on both 
tobacco and handguns by launching a wave of lawsuits designed to 
win through legal threats what they have been unable to win in 
Congress and state legislatures . . . . 
. . . . 
If gun-control advocates achieve their goals by legal threats, rather 
than through properly enacted legislation, it will be a Pyrrhic 
victory.  With good reason, gun-owners will never accept their defeat 
as legitimate. 
Far from standing up for voters against powerful entrenched 
interests, America’s mayors and state attorneys-general—and the 
anti-tobacco and anti-gun campaigners egging them on—are 
  
 417 Center for Policy Alternatives, Gun Lawsuit Preemption, 
http://www.stateaction.org/issues/issue.cfm/issue/GunLawsuitPreemption.xml (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 418 One of the claims is negligent or intentional market dumping (below 
market price sales).  The irony is that for decades, municipal police departments have 
traded in their used side arms for newer weapons.  The trade-ins have been some of the 
best bargains in the gun market. 
  For discussion and criticism of the practice, see Hunter T. George, Should 
Police Trade in Guns? Critics Say Practice Puts Cheap Weapons on Street for Crime, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 30, 1999, at B1; Vanessa O’Connell, Unloading 
Old Police Guns: More Cities Ban Trade-Ins and Resales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1999, at 
B1 (discussing the decisions of New Orleans, Miami, St. Louis and Bridgeport, 
Connecticut to abandon or review the decades old practice of trading in old weapons for 
steep price breaks on new ones). 
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themselves ramming down the throats of voters polices which they 
have not endorsed.419 
This sort of comment is perhaps easy to dismiss coming 
from The Economist.  But Robert Reich, former member of the 
Clinton cabinet and seemingly more sympathetic to restrictive 
gun control measures, says basically the same thing: 
If I had my way, there’d be laws restricting cigarettes and handguns.  
But this Congress won’t even pass halfway measures. . . .  Almost 
makes you lose faith in democracy, doesn’t it?  
. . . . 
The goal of [recent litigation] efforts is to threaten the industries 
with the risk of such large penalties that they’ll agree to a deal—for 
the gunmakers, to limit bulk purchases and put more safety devices 
on guns to prevent accidental shootings.  
But the way to fix everything isn’t to turn our backs on the 
democratic process and pursue litigation as the [Clinton] 
administration is doing.  It’s to campaign for people who promise to 
take action against cigarettes and guns, and against the re-election 
of House and Senate members who won’t. . . .  In short, the answer is 
to make democracy work better, not give upon [sic] it.420 
It is plausible to respond that NRA money has skewed 
the democratic process, leaving the Courts as the best fair 
alternative.  But this ignores the fact that the NRA’s power is 
not money but votes.  George Will writes: 
The NRA is a coast to coast nation within a nation . . . .  The NRA 
has only 4 million adult members . . . .  [A]bout 95 percent of NRA 
members vote. 
Each of the 4 million pays $35 in annual dues.  Polls indicate that 
another 14 million Americans think they are NRA members and an 
additional 28 million think they are affiliated in some way with the 
NRA because of their membership in one or more of the 35,000 
shooting and hunting clubs.421 
For all the talk about NRA power, there is an even 
simpler explanation for the general failure of the 
prohibitionists’ movement:  It is very hard to push an agenda 
  
 419 When Lawsuits Make Policy, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1998, at 17. 
 420 Robert B. Reich, Smoking, Guns, AM. PROSPECT, JAN. 17, 2000, at 64, 
available at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint 
&articleId=4343. 
 421 George F. Will, Bringing Out the Big Guns, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2004, at 
A31. 
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that conflicts with the choice of roughly half of American 
households to own guns. 
Approaching the 2004 presidential election, Congress 
considered legislation immunizing the gun industry from 
lawsuits brought by victims of firearms crimes.  It was 
burdened by a Democrat amendment requiring extension of the 
Assault Weapons Ban and thus stalled.422  In the midst all of 
this, there is a revolution underway.  Josh Sugarman was 
correct that Americans had lost interest in handgun bans.423  
But his lament does not capture the full story.  Something 
much more dramatic is afoot.  State by state, Americans are 
embracing the idea of armed self-defense through state 
statutes liberalizing the concealed carry of handguns.424 
By 2004, thirty-eight states had liberal concealed carry 
legislation (another eight have a restrictive form).425  As the 
2004 presidential campaign wound to a close, John Kerry was 
working the gun issue by cozying up to hunters.  Whether 
duded up and tramping through an Ohio cornfield toting a 
semiautomatic shotgun that (with a different stock 
configuration) would be a contraband assault weapon under 
the 1994 law, or telling stories about crawling around on his 
belly hunting deer with his trusty double-barrel shotgun,426 
  
 422 See Steven Harras, Gun Manufacturer Protection Bill Surprisingly 
Defeated in U.S. Senate, 32 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 221, 221 (2004) (describing how 
S. 1805, immunizing gun manufacturers and dealers from suits by victims of gun 
crime, seemed destined for easy passage until it was killed by an amendment 
extending the ban on so called assault weapons). 
 423 See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
 424 The antigun Brady organization has compiled a list of states with the most 
citizens per capita licensed to carry concealed firearms. 
Where most nonfelons may carry concealed weapons: Alaska, Washington, 
Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida. 
Justin Ewers, Choose a Weapon, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 10, 2003, at 56. 
 425 See NRA Fact Sheet, supra note 175. 
 426 Kerry got a pass from the mainstream media, but the web is filled with 
incredulity and ribald comments about Kerry’s claim.  One of the less inflammatory 
writers observes: 
Apparently hoping to outdo Hillary Clinton’s improbable attempt to reinvent 
herself as a duck hunter, John Kerry has tried to avoid alienating supporters 
of gun rights by depicting himself as a deer hunter.  Mark Steyn will have 
none of it.  Steyn wrote in the London Telegraph yesterday: “He was in 
Wisconsin the other day, pretending to be a regular guy, and was asked what 
kind of hunting he preferred.  ‘I’d have to say deer,’ said the senator.  ‘I go out 
with my trusty 12-gauge double-barrel, crawl around on my 
 
792 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
Kerry showed that gun prohibition—the handgun ban Bill 
Clinton speculated about in 1993—was not even on the table in 
America in 2004.  About the same time, the Assault Weapons 
Ban, so much the political touchstone in 1994, expired with a 
whimper—though not without some dishonest media effort to 
invigorate it.427 
  
stomach . . . .  That’s hunting.’  This caused huge hilarity among my New 
Hampshire neighbours.  None of us has ever heard of anybody deer hunting 
by crawling around on his stomach, even in Massachusetts.” 
Oh, Deer: Steyn Shoots Down Kerry’s Hunting Tale, NEWSMAX.COM, July 28, 2004, 
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2004/7/28/121032.shtml. 
 427 As the ban was set to expire, CNN Miami Bureau chief aired a report 
about the ban that CNN quickly had to apologize for and correct.  The CNN report gave 
the impression that the ban was about machine guns and then staged a shooting 
demonstration that suggested the banned guns also were much more powerful than 
similar but legal ones.  World Net Daily reports: 
In two broadcasts last Thursday, CNN incorrectly reported that fully 
automatic weapons are currently banned under the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.  The CNN broadcasts included firing 
demonstrations by the Broward County, Fla., Sheriff’s Department that 
implied currently banned weapons are much more powerful than similar but 
legal one, when in fact that is not the case. 
As reported by the Washington Times, during one of the demonstrations 
Broward County Sheriff Ken Jenne introduced a detective who fired an old 
Chinese AK-47. 
“That is one of the 19 currently banned weapons,” said Jon Zarella, CNN’s 
Miami bureau chief.  In fact, that firearm was not one of those banned under 
the 1994 act.  The detective fired six shots, after which Zarella said, “Ok. Now 
that was semiautomatic.” 
Jenne then responded, “Now this is automatic.” 
The detective fired a burst at a cinder-block target, after which Zarella 
declared: “Wow!  That obliterated those blocks . . . .  Absolutely obliterated it.  
And you can tell the difference,” according to the Times report. 
Machine guns, AK-47s and other fully automatic weapons are regulated by 
the National Firearms Act of 1934.  The 1994 law banned some 
semiautomatic, military-style rifles and will expire in September 2004 if 
Congress does not renew it.  Semiautomatic guns fire one shot each time the 
trigger is pulled. 
. . . .  
Yesterday, CNN clarified which firearms are banned under the 1994 law and 
told viewers the ban is based on external features such as whether the 
weapon has a pistol grip or a flash suppressor. 
A CNN anchor introduced yesterday’s broadcast by saying: “On this program 
on Thursday, we aired a live demonstration CNN set up with law-
enforcement officials of a banned semiautomatic rifle and its legal 
counterpart.  We reviewed that demonstration . . . and decided that a more 
detailed report would better explain this complex issue.” 
. . . .  
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By the end of November, Republicans had won the 
House, Senate and the White House and Democratic strategists 
were headed back to the drawing board to figure how to sell the 
politics of Manhattan’s Upper West Side to red America.428  By 
early 2005 the Department of Justice had released a 
memorandum reflecting the position of the United States that 
the individual rights view of the Second Amendment (the 
“standard model”)429 is correct.430  In early 2005 the National 
Academy of Sciences published a 328 page report evaluating 
eighty different gun control measures.431  This exhaustive 
treatment concludes that we cannot say with any confidence 
that gun control has had any effect on crime432 and recommends 
  
On Thursday, the camera showed bullets hitting a cinder-block target as the 
Broward County detective fired an AK-47 in [automatic] mode.  When the 
detective fired a legal semiautomatic firearm, the camera showed an 
undamaged cinder-block target. 
On Friday, CNN admitted the detective had not been firing at the cinder 
block. 
“In fact, if you fire the same caliber and type bullets from the two guns, you 
get the same impact,” Zarella said in yesterday’s broadcast. 
CNN ‘Backpedals’ on Gun Story: Admits it Misled Viewers in Comparing Different 
Types of Weapons, WORLDNETDAILY, May 20, 2003, http://www.wnd.com/news/ 
article.asp?ARTICLE_ID= 32677.  The gun crowd often cites this as an illustration of 
the general media bias against gun rights.  The episode is sparsely covered in the main 
stream media.  One mainstream source is a National Public Radio feature, exploring 
whether the mainstream media is guilty of biased coverage of gun issues.  See Gun Shy 
(NPR radio broadcast Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://www.onthemedia.org 
/transcripts/transcripts_031105_guns.html.  For the original CNN transcript, see 
CNN.com, Transcripts, Live From the Headlines: Assault Weapon Ban Up for Renewal 
Soon (CNN television broadcast May 15, 2003), http://edition.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/0305/15/se.13.html.  
 428 See supra note 380. 
 429 Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the 
Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996);  Kopel, supra note 62, at 1362 & n.1.  
 430 DOJ Memorandum, supra note 22. 
The conclusion is thus inescapable that the history, concept, and wording of 
the second amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as its 
interpretation by every major commentator and court in the first half-century 
after its ratification, indicates that what is protected is an individual right of 
a private citizen to own and carry firearms in a peaceful manner. 
SUBCOMM. ON THE CONST. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUD., 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE 
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 12 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 431 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: 
A CRITICAL REVIEW (2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309091241/html. 
 432 “These programs are widely viewed as effective, but in fact knowledge of 
whether and how they reduce crime is limited. Without a stronger research base, policy 
makers considering adoption of similar programs in other settings must make decisions 
without knowing the true benefits and costs of these policing and sentencing 
interventions.”  Id. at 10. 
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further study.433  Similarly, a panel consisting mainly of gun 
control supporters commissioned by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention to evaluate the effectiveness of existing 
gun control measures found that there is no conclusive 
evidence that gun control has had any impact on crime.434  By 
the fall of 2005, the contentious question of gun manufacturers’ 
liability for illegal use of their products was resolved 
democratically.435  On October 26, 2005, President Bush signed 
the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act.436  The 
legislation passed 65-31 in the Senate and 283-144 in the 
House.437 
Much of the factional dispute over gun rights results 
from fear that any particular measure is just a step toward 
much more severe restrictions.  The avowed agenda of the 
prohibitionists makes this fear, on the long view of things, 
understandable.  Verifying that the prohibitionists’ movement 
is alive and well is San Francisco’s newly enacted Proposition 
“H.”  Approved by fifty-eight percent of voters, Proposition H 
bans possession of handguns within city limits.  This reinstates 
San Francisco onto the short list of municipalities that have 
banned handguns.  Current owners have until April 2006 to 
surrender their guns.  Predictably, the measure was applauded 
by the Brady organization and decried by the NRA, which has 
commenced litigation challenging the constitutionality of the 
ban.438 
For now, at least, the constitutional politics of gun 
control supports two conclusions.  First, under any standard, 
prohibitionists have not marshaled the support to sustain the 
  
 433 Id.  For criticism that the evidence supports the unqualified conclusion 
that the laws studied simply do not reduce crime, see John R. Lott, Jr., Shooting 
Blanks, N.Y. POST, Dec. 29, 2004, available at http://www.tsra.com/Lott119.htm. 
 434 TASK FORCE ON CMTY. PREVENTIVE SERVS., First Reports Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of Strategies for Preventing Violence: Firearms Laws (2003), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5214a2.htm. 
 435 The New York Times editorial page, perhaps reflecting the views that 
prompted the lawsuits in the first place, rejected the idea that this was democracy at 
work.  See The Gun Industry Rolls Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at A26.  Query 
though how one is to tell whether Congress is serving the people (in this case the gun 
people) or has gotten rolled. 
 436 Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005). 
 437 GovTrack.us, S. 397: Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 
http://www.govtrack.us /congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-397 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 438 See Susan Jones, NRA Challenges San Francisco Gun Ban, 
CNSNEWS.COM, Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp? 
Page=%5CNation%5Carchive%5C200511%5CNAT20051110b.html; San Francisco, 
NRA Make Deal on Handgun Ban, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 28, 2005, 
http://www.forbes.com/home/feeds/ap/2005/12/28/ap2418176.html. 
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claim that “We the People” have spoken against an individual 
right to arms.  Second, the very opposite has happened.  
America has endorsed the right to arms through signals that, 
compared to Ackerman’s complex theory of a transformative 
New Deal, are more legitimate because they are easier for the 
citizenry at large to detect and understand. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Speaking critically of efforts to marginalize the Second 
Amendment, Justice Antonin Scalia mused that perhaps few 
tears will be shed if the Court finally concludes that there is no 
constitutional right to arms.439  A captive of the beltway, Justice 
Scalia can be forgiven for this impression.  If the job took him 
out more often to the forty plus states with explicit right to 
arms guarantees, the thirty-eight with strong right to carry 
laws or pressed him into conversation with some of the 
common folks who make up the seventy-six percent of 
Americans who think they have a constitutional right to own 
firearms, he might express a different sentiment.  And odd as it 
may seem, it is Professor Ackerman who, if true to his 
principles, would be the first to tell the good Justice that these 
signals are some of the best reasons for the Court to raise up 
an individual right to arms from the disputed Second 
Amendment. 
There is a final practical point.  It is obvious that many 
of us weight the costs of guns differently.  Some people 
viscerally hate guns, see no utility in them and think it is 
insane to talk about balancing factors like the benefits of 
defensive gun use and the political value of an armed citizenry.  
These benefits though are for a second group, core points in a 
thoughtful approach to the gun question.  And there is a third 
group that is just as visceral about gun rights as the first is 
about gun control. 
The single thing all three groups agree on is that there 
are some people who should not have guns—criminals, the 
insane, etc.  Beyond that there seems little common ground.  
Because many in the first group have acknowledged that their 
ultimate aim is prohibition but also have said it will have to be 
achieved incrementally, those in the second and third group 
  
 439 See Antonin Scalia, Vigilante Justices: The Dying Constitution, 49 NAT’L 
REV. 32, 32-33 (1997) (“We may like . . . the elimination of the right to bear arms; but 
let us not pretend that these are not reductions of rights.”). 
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tend to view many gun control proposals as another scoot down 
the slippery slope.  If the Court finally takes prohibition off the 
table by affirming that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right, the central barrier to consensus on measures 
that would further restrict the untrustworthy from accessing 
guns would dissolve.  That would be good for all of us. 
